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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. SOF AT A GLANCE 
To mention the phrase ‘special operations forces’ within earshot of most citizens 
of the modern industrial world will immediately bring widely diverse names and national 
affiliations to mind: American Navy SEAL Platoons and Army Special Forces Groups: 
German Kommando Spezialkraefte (KSK) Units; British Special Boat Service Squadrons 
and Special Air Service Regiments; Russian SPETSNAZ Companies and OMON Units; 
South African Special Forces Brigades; South Korean Marines; Brazilian GRUMEC 
Groups; Singaporean Commando Battalions; Swiss Canton Tactical Units. (Yes, even 
tiny, perpetually neutral Switzerland owns a SOF unit.)  
The nationalities, capabilities and missions of the individual forces may vary 
depending on the wealth and national strategies of the individual countries but the visual 
image and understanding of dedicated SOF remains predictably uniform. Dedicated SOF 
usually operate in relatively small units that can achieve with a few what conventional 
forces might not be able or willing with many (1); dedicated SOF are composed of 
highly-trained, skilled and motivated operators who underwent grueling ‘rights of 
passage’ to gain admission into their particular units and often operate without the 
benefits of external support; dedicated SOF usually get the best most high-tech 
equipment and weapons that their countries can offer, but are fully capable of working 
the low-tech end of the spectrum; dedicated SOF operators are physically, mentally and 
spiritually tougher than most and are assigned the most difficult and dangerous missions 
to accomplish, often within enemy-controlled territory, so are usually considered the 
‘elite’ of their respective military services (2). 
 
B. WHY PLA SOF? 
Like some countries that have developed dedicated SOF units, China’s People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) has a tradition in successful special operations warfare. This 
tradition dates back to the Chinese struggle against Japanese forces during the 1930s and 
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Second World War. These operations were conducted by ordinary soldiers who had been 
formed into temporary composite units, given specialized training and tasking and sent 
on specific missions, after which they’d return to their original units (3). Disregarding the 
temporary nature of these units, their missions still covered the gamut of special 
operations tasking (long-range penetrations, tactical reconnaissance, raids on vital enemy 
positions, prisoner rescue). The introduction of dedicated SOF units within the Chinese 
military structure is a relatively recent development, the first experimental unit 
established in the Guangzhou military region in 1988s to implement the idea of providing 
“special mission rapid reaction” capabilities to the PLA’s existing Rapid Reaction Forces 
(4). 
So, what happened? Why did the PLA decide at that point in history that it 
required the services of a dedicated group of soldiers whose primary charter was to 
conduct special operations tasking on a full-time basis during times of peace and war? 
The PRC’s decision to create and develop these kind of forces, a sort that had never been 
within the ranks of the PLA until then, did not just come out of the clear blue sky or on a 
whimsy. SOF personnel and units are difficult to build and require an investment in time, 
work and capital that cannot be viewed lightly. The screening process to find the kinds of 
individuals of suitable physical, mental and spiritual character to even begin the weeding-
out process is thorough and extensive. Initial training alone eliminates the weaker 
candidates and can encompass several years, after which the soldier continues on to more 
advanced job specific training and must be prepared to assume an extremely rigorous 
operational tempo. Members of the United States’ dedicated SOF units, Army Special 
Forces, Navy SEALs and the like, might have to volunteer several times and wait several 
years for acceptance to begin initial training. Washout rates among the selected 
candidates run anywhere from 70-90 percent. According to Chuck Pfarrer, a graduate of 
BUD/S Class 114 and former member of SEAL Teams 4 and 6, some BUD/S classes 
graduated nobody (5). 1 Initial training alone can run from 16 to 18 months and cost 
upwards of US $300,000, after which a soldier moves into an operational unit and 
undergoes more advanced and expensive training. From the beginning date of initial 
 
1 Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL training: initial instruction for SEAL candidates. 
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training, turning out an effective SOF team member, requires between 5 and 8 years of 
training and operational experience, during which time the team member is usually “on 
the road,” either on a training or real world evolution. 2 These are but a few normal 
issues, let alone the larger ones of political and doctrinal inclination, financial ability and 
strategic necessity, that any state must routinely tackle in order to create and develop 
dedicated SOF forces.  
To discern some idea as to what the PRC intends and why it believes that it needs 
dedicated SOF contingents when it had previously made do with well-trained temporaries 
requires a knowledge of what kinds of events and changes were going on in China and 
the world to inspire an adjustment in the PLA force structure. What domestic historical 
and political lessons had the PRC and PLA learned during the preceding decades that 
would cause them to change their own perspectives and lead them towards viewing 
dedicated SOF units as beneficial? What had happened, was happening, on a global scale 
that the PRC and PLA could observe, analyze and turn into additional positive lessons 
that would influence them to create and develop their first dedicated SOF contingents? 
What had to change doctrinally, militarily and politically within the PRC and PLA to 
develop the sort of atmosphere in which dedicated SOF units could emerge and thrive 
within their armed forces and state? What exactly did, rather does, the PRC seek to 
achieve as a nation that it would even entertain the thought of creating and developing 
dedicated SOF contingents.  
What can SOF do for the United States? Dedicated American SOF units perform 
a wide range of missions which fit within several primary mission areas (6):   
Direct Action (DA)-A SOF principal mission involving short-
duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF to seize, 
destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage on designated personnel or 
materiel. 
Special Reconnaissance (SR)-A SOF principal mission involving 
reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or 
verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information 
concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an actual or 
 
2 Opinions voiced by Army Special Forces officers, SO3880 (History of Special Operations), Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
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potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, 
hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)-A principal SOF mission 
involving participation by civilian and military agencies of a government 
in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and 
protect its society from lawlessness, subversion and insurgency. 
Unconventional Warfare (UW)-A SOF principal mission 
involving a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, 
normally of long-duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or 
surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and 
directed in varying degrees by an external source. 
Counter-Terrorism (CT)-Offensive measures to prevent, deter 
and respond to terrorism. 
Counter-Proliferation (CP)-A SOF principal mission which 
refers to the activities of the Department Of Defense across the full range 
of government efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs). 
Civil Affairs (CA)-A SOF principal mission involving advising 
and assisting commanders in establishing, maintaining, influencing or 
exploiting relations between military forces and civil authorities, both 
governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian population in a 
friendly, neutral or hostile area of operation in order to facilitate military 
operations and consolidate operational objectives. 
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)-A SOF principal mission 
involving planned operations to convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups and individuals.  
Information Warfare (IW)-A SOF principal mission involving 
actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary 
information, information-based process, information systems and 
computer-based networks while defending one’s own similar assets.   
 
The United States’ dedicated SOF capabilities are offensive and expeditionary in 
nature and, more importantly, constitute a power projection capability for one that would 
use them. In 1997, 2,000-3,000 American SOF personnel were deployed on 150 missions 
in 60-70 countries around the globe per week (7). In light of the current Global War On 
Terrorism and the Bush Administration’s efforts to beef up the size and strength of the 
military’s SOF contingents, that number is probably, quite naturally, higher.  
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There appear to have been three primary drivers behind the creation and 
development of dedicated SOF within the PLA, an armed force that prior to 1988 had no 
strategic use or political desire for such units or soldiers. The first driver was a profound 
doctrinal shift during the 1980s that changed the fundamental nature of how China 
perceived the future of warfare. The doctrine of People’s War and its emphasis on 
defense and fighting large-scale long-duration manpower-intensive wars within Chinese 
borders gave way to Local Limited War and its outward looking, more offensive and 
technologically-centered perspective. The second driver was the modernization and 
professionalization of the PLA, inspired and accelerated by China’s disastrous ‘punitive 
war’ against Vietnam in 1979. The PRC and PLA had reached a tacit understanding that 
such a humiliation at the hands of a smaller but more modern and professional force most 
likely meant defeat against their primary adversaries at the time: the former Soviet Union. 
The third driver was the First Gulf War in 1991 and the lessons and observations taken 
away by the PLA regarding the Coalition’s success in it. The doctrine of Local Limited 
War was upgraded to Local War Under High Tech Conditions to address the dominance 
of American technology in every facet of the conflict and to emulate it on a smaller scale 
within select units of the PLA. The creation and development of a dedicated PLA SOF 
capability got a boost from the First Gulf War. As a result PLA SOF contingents emulate 
American dedicated SOF units in many regards, particularly in the emphasis on using 
high-technology gear to give itself a qualitative advantage over its adversaries. 
 
C. PLA SOF AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
A fundamental area in which PLA SOF organizations differ from the American 
ones that they tended to emulate is in the overarching mission area of Unconventional 
Warfare. Regardless of their superb Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance 
capabilities, American SOF, the United States Army Special Forces in particular, claim 
Unconventional Warfare as their primary raison d’être (8). Why not the PLA? The 
Chinese armed forces are certainly capable of developing a UW capability. The PRC’s 
attempts to export of Communism and Communist insurgencies in Asia, and Mao’s first 
two stages of People’s War are straight UW campaigns, the former external and the latter 
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domestic. What is it about the PRC’s political and strategic inclinations and the PLA’s 
contemporary doctrinal bent that do not foster or encourage the creation and development 
of a concerted UW capability within the Chinese armed forces, let alone their SOF 
contingents? Is this a foregone conclusion? 
This thesis argues that UW is a doctrinally unnecessary capability for the current 
PLA and a politically unattractive option for the PRC because of two factors. First, Local 
War Under High Tech Conditions emphasizes a violent, lightning-fast regional conflict 
that is over in a short amount of time; PLA SOF units are tailored to fit within that 
doctrine, focusing their efforts on DA and SR (9) mission capabilities and the ability to 
strike hard and fast in support of the current military doctrine and PRC power projection 
objectives. UW has a wholly contrary bent, emphasizing long-duration operations, often 
in enemy territory, while using friendly host populations as surrogate forces (US and 
PRC in Vietnam). Second, a PLA SOF UW capability is unnecessary to the objectives the 
PRC wants to achieve in the Asia region. It does not want to export Communism or 
inspire and support Communist insurrections within others’ borders any longer, but build 
economic interdependence with its neighbors (10) as a means of reducing the possibility 
of armed conflict while enriching itself and achieving dominance in the region. An 
integral UW capability is an ill fit where intraregional political and economic tools, not 
external military adventures, seem to give the PRC influence and power.   
This thesis first approaches the creation and development of dedicated PLA SOF 
as an environmental evolution, fostering the kind of atmosphere in which a dedicated 
SOF capability could actually emerge within the PLA military structure. It discusses the 
history and concept of People’s War, the modernization and professionalization of the 
PLA, the doctrinal shift to Local Limited War and how the three factors interacted during 
a time of major historical change to bring about an environment in which dedicated PLA 
SOF contingents could emerge. Next, the thesis discusses the First Gulf War, how it 
helped modify Local Limited War to Local War Under High Tech Conditions and the 




developed afterwards. Lastly, this thesis discusses PRC intentions, where PLA SOF fit 
into them, and the potential for the creation and development of an American SOF-type 
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II. DOCTRINAL SHIFTS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON 
PLA SOF 
Before delving into the subject of Special operations Forces (SOF) within the 
Chinese military, it is important to examine the background and evolution of twentieth 
century Chinese military development and doctrine. This examination will attempt to 
uncover the elements involved in and important to creating an atmosphere in the Chinese 
military where the creation of dedicated PLA SOF units were considered viable 
components of Chinese doctrinal thought and valuable assets to the Chinese war machine 
and state. 
 
A. PEOPLE WAR AND THE DEFENSIVE MINDSET 
People’s War was nothing new to the PLA. The Maoist-devised and inspired 
strategy of garnering the collective power of the Chinese state, primarily its rural 
peasants, had its true genesis during the late 1920’s when the communist forces first 
clashed swords against the Chinese Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-Shek and the 
Republic Of China (ROC) regime (11). Whenever People’s War has emerged as the 
primary Chinese warfighting strategy it has always been a defensive reflex tied to 
China’s collective perception of weakness in comparison to its real or potential 
aggressors and, if not besieged by, then under threat from these seemingly more powerful 
foes (12).  
People’s war as advocated by Mao would occur in three distinct phases. The 
defensive phase entailed a retreat by the PLA into the country’s interior and a mass 
mobilization of the state’s population and resources to resist the invaders. A vigorous 
popular guerrilla campaign would also emerge to harass the enemy forces every step of 
the way. Using sabotage, hit-and-run attacks and the comfort and goodwill of the local 
population, the guerrillas would avoid pitched battles with the more powerful enemy 
forces while gradually chipping away at their will to continue the fight. The stalemate 
phase would occur when the enemy could advance no further into the interior and had 
actually begun to consolidate their positions, even going over to the defensive themselves 
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in an attempt to maintain their positions. Conversely, the PLA and guerrilla forces would 
have grown strong enough themselves to hold the invaders at bay, while still avoiding 
large, potentially negatively decisive battles, continuing to wear down the invader’s will 
to continue fighting, and marshalling their own forces for the third and final phase of 
People’s War. The counterattack, the third and last phase of People’s War, would occur 
when the PLA and guerrilla forces had grown in sufficient military and political (popular) 
strength that they could convert to the conventional attack and take on the invading forces 
with a reasonable chance of success. Ideally, the invaders would be defeated in a single 
or a series of decisive battles and completely driven from Chinese soil (13).          
The intervening periods of Japanese occupation and world war, if anything, 
seemed to strengthen the viability and validity of Mao’s strategy. The Chinese military 
had been handily defeated by the more organized and westernized Japanese forces and its 
government forced to flee. Despite the rivalry between Mao’s Communists and Chiang’s 
Nationalists, both parties readily agreed that they would need to unite to defeat and 
eventually expel the Japanese invaders. Neither Communist nor Nationalist had any 
illusions about China’s overt military inferiority to the Japanese, so guerrilla warfare 
emerged as a simple matter of course as the only realistic choice of effective strategies in 
which to defend their beleaguered nation. The Japanese were obvious and unabashedly 
brutal invaders, yet somehow attempted to control the occupied territories through a 
system of Japanese-friendly ‘puppet’ governments, which were already unpopular to the 
Chinese people. The Japanese refusal to deal with either the Communists or Nationalists 
made their situation in China worse.  
Under the tenets of People’s War, what remained of the army and the masses 
were organized into guerrilla forces that would, with Allied assistance (14), chip away at 
the Japanese military’s initially superior military power. Through sabotage and hit-and-
run skirmishes, the guerrilla attacks weakened the Japanese army, forcing them to 
disperse to deal with the phantom attacks, while denying them any opportunity to catch 
them in large numbers and crush them in detail. The constant harassment was designed to 
wear out the enemy, sap its will to resist and continue while providing the guerillas a 
converse opportunity to garner support with the population and grow in numbers and 
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strength. The conclusion of China’s People’s War against Japan came when the enemy 
had been defeated and forced to not only relinquish the territories it had conquered and 
occupied, but withdraw from the mainland. People’s War had worked in collusion with 
superior Allied military power to defeat the Japanese in 1945, and it was also a handy 
strategy for the communists against their Nationalist opponents during the resumption of 
civil warfare from 1945 until 1949. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was able to 
garner support from the peasant masses and create guerilla armies to fight its Nationalist 
opponents. This was probably not a particularly hard sell for the majority of the Chinese 
peasantry. They had lived in poverty under Chiang Kia-Shek’s corrupt government and 
European colonial powers before the horror of the Japanese occupation. They were 
looking at more of the same should Chiang and the Chinese Nationalists win the civil war 
against the communists, but this time with the backing of the Soviet Union or United 
States (15). Mao invoked the memory of European colonial rule, Japanese occupation, 
and Chiang’s corrupt administration and offered what seemed an attractive alternative 
system of government that promised equality and an opportunity to rise above one’s 
station in life. The communists de-legitimized Chiang’s and the Nationalist’s claims to 
the Chinese government in the eyes of the masses. Under Mao’s leadership, the 
communist forces grew in size and strength and ultimately defeated the Nationalists, 
forcing them and Chiang into exile on the island of Taiwan while establishing the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland.  
With the financial, military and technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the PRC 
attempted to modernize during the 1950s. It was already well on its way to doing so. The 
economy was beginning a slow transition away from its agrarian base and towards 
industrialization. The vast peasant guerrilla forces were being organized and equipped on 
modern Soviet lines to fight a high-tech European-style war in Asia (16). China even had 
a nascent nuclear program afoot. The entire Soviet-sponsored modernization effort came 
to a screeching halt in 1959 when the Soviet Union pulled its support. The infrastructural 
groundwork for a modern China had been laid but not yet solidified, forcing the PRC to 
fall back on what it knew best and had in abundance: people. Isolated from the world’s  
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expanding, lucrative and increasingly interconnected economic systems and forced to go 
it alone, the PRC under Mao stressed ‘self-reliance’ and enforced the state’s isolation 
from the rest of the world.  
The PRC simultaneously attempted to cultivate liaisons and garner influence with 
weaker Third-World states not in the American or Soviet orbits, portraying themselves as 
champions and protectors of Third-World development and well-being, and as an 
alternative to allying with either of the two superpowers (17). In the absence of modern 
assistance and with the Soviet Union and United States as potential enemies, Chinese 
military self-reliance meant a return to People’s War and the defensive-minded 
perception of being threatened by much stronger rivals. With the United States and Soviet 
Union perceived as its primary opponents, China would still rely on its peasant masses, 
plus the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and limited modern equipment (tanks, aircraft, 
naval vessels), to fight its enemies. They would vacate the urban areas and fall back to 
the industrial and support centers in the country’s interior, drawing in their opponents 
into favorable situations in which they would be harassed and slowly worn down by 
guerrilla and regular PLA forces. When both had grown numerous and strong enough to 
strike back with enough power, they would defeat and expel the invaders, as Soviet 
Russia had in 1941-1945 (18).  People’s War remained the PRC’s primary national 
military doctrine from its reinstitution in the late 1950s until the middle 1980s. There was 
very little variation from its thrust or direction, save a slight name change in 1978 to 
People’s War Under Modern Conditions, which reflected China’s previous Soviet-
assisted efforts at modernization and its possession of nuclear weapons since 1964 (19).  
Maoist-inspired People’s War was as much a political tool as it was a national 
military strategy, and the appearance, composition and training of the PLA bore this out. 
The vast majority of its fighting power revolved around massive numbers of soldiers. The 
bulk of the PLA’s manpower lay in China’s peasant masses. Their military training was 
difficult and thorough but firmly based on 19th century notions of the battlefield 
dominance of infantry rather than addressing the increasing complexity and technological 
realities of modern warfare. The withdrawal of Soviet assistance left the PLA bereft of a 
modern technological base; it was stuck with what it had obtained prior to the Soviet 
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pullout. It had to make do for the next two decades as indicated by the current 
preponderance of 1950s and 1960s technology within its gradually modernizing armed 
forces.  
The PLA was stuck with the sole military resources it possessed in abundance: 
people and geopolitical space. Political training and indoctrination of this mass army was 
also extremely thorough and in fact often given a higher priority than traditional military 
skills. Political indoctrination sessions occurred up to three times a day within the PLA 
and might consume 30 to 40 percent of a soldier’s time (20). Political Commissars held 
equal rank and authority to military commanders and had the power to overrule military 
decisions for political considerations. Soldiers were promoted and demoted within the 
PLA based largely on political standing and reliability rather than tactical and technical 
proficiency. Even the lack of visible rank insignia in PLA uniforms after 1965 and the 
designation of soldiers as either “fighters” or “commanders” was an indication of how 
great an emphasis was placed on political reliability within the PLA’s ranks at the 
expense of tactical and technical acumen. The politicization of the military and de-
emphasis of the professional aspects of soldiering were primarily a control mechanism to 
ensure the PLA’s loyalty to Chinese Communist Party, a throwback to the 1950’s when 
the Party feared it would lose control of the military if it became a professional force 
along Soviet lines.  
People’s War may have been a purely defensive military strategy that mirrored 
China’s concerns about threats from invasion, but it embodied some important aspects of 
contemporary SOF missions in its bent towards Unconventional Warfare as defined by 
Thomas K. Adams (21).  
1) People’s War did not seek to defeat or destroy conventional enemy forces outright 
but through a carefully cultivated domestic resistance campaign that garnered 
mass support for the fighters and subverted the cause of the enemy forces. 
2) People’s War relied on capitalizing on a resistance force’s strengths and 
capabilities rather than its weaknesses and shortcomings when compared to 
invading conventional enemy forces. 
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3) People’s War was a nominally military strategy that eventually sought to crush 
enemy forces in the field, but achieved ultimately political results in that it sought 
to grind away an enemy’s commitment and will to continue hostilities.  
Because of the defensive and political orientation of the People’s War doctrine, 
the creation of a dedicated SOF contingent within the PLA would have been very 
difficult if not impossible. Standing SOF units, particularly those of the United States, are 
primarily offensive in nature. Their full time charter is to provide a ready force, 
peacetime or wartime, capable of infiltrating and attacking the enemy where it feels most 
secure. Modern SOF units are power projection tools, operating either in support of larger 
conventional military initiatives or national strategic objectives. Standing SOF units 
enjoy a level of institutional autonomy not present in conventional forces and require 
soldiers who are independent-minded, professional, tactically and technically adept and 
fully dedicated to mastering their trade. Consequently, the PRC didn’t need a standing 
offensive force of potentially dangerous “free-thinkers” in the PLA. It wanted to maintain 
control of the PLA and it wanted a military force that was heavily indoctrinated 
politically and utterly loyal to the Party. The PLA was no stranger to special operations. 
Selected soldiers drawn from line units were brought together and given special training 
for specific missions. They would infiltrate to the target, often dressed in civilian clothes, 
conduct the mission, then return to their parent units (22). According to a propaganda 
piece written by a Hong Kong journalist privy to an operation in 1997:  
China has a long special forces history. During the Red Army era, we had 
the crack “Pistol Teams.” During the War of Resistance Against Japan, 
our “Rear Area Armed Working Teams” made an impressive showing. 
And in the Korean War, Chinese special forces blew up key U.S. military 
bridges, disrupting the whole U.S. military battle formation. The most 
famous was a surprise attack by Chinese special forces on South Korea's 
most crack capital division, the White Tiger Regiment HQ, which made 
the decisive contribution to China's smashing of the White Tiger Regiment 
(23). 
Prior to the modernization/professionalization of the PLA and doctrinal shift to 
the more offensive and outward-looking Local Limited War, dedicated, professional PLA 
SOF were an unwelcome hazard to the PRC. 
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B. MODERNIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 
There are two primary influences, the Four Modernizations and the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese War, responsible for setting the PLA on the road towards modernization and 
professionalization. Following Mao Zedong’s death and the ouster of his weaker 
immediate successor, Hua Guofeng, who sought to keep the PRC on a less progressive 
Maoist path (24), the PRC’s new leader Deng Xiaoping, was free to pursue causes that he 
had championed since the 1950s and implement these causes into policies. 3 Chairman 
Deng was a pragmatic man and a forward thinker who did not want his country to fall 
any further behind the rest of the developing world than it already had. He emphasized 
changing the PRC’s outlook on the world and his country’s place in it, comparing 
China’s self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world as “national suicide” (25). Deng 
was also determined to bring China out of its primitive existence; the Four 
Modernizations was a policy that detailed the broad areas that the PRC sought to develop 
in pursuit of that goal. Military modernization was the fourth and last priority behind the 
development of agriculture, industry and science and technology, as the Party leadership 
believed that greater priority on military modernization would hurt China’s efforts to 
strengthen itself economically (26). Nevertheless, military modernization was a key 
component of the Four Modernizations policy and was supported by both civilian and 
military leadership, particularly after Deng Xaioping consolidated his power by 
becoming Chairman of the Party Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1981.   
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war was only sixteen days long but revealed 
specific and glaring shortcomings in the PLA’s military capabilities, giving additional 
impetus for the fledgling military modernization effort. The war was “punitive” in nature, 
devised to teach the Vietnamese a lesson for having invaded Cambodia in December 
1978 (27). The PLA's largest military operation since the Korean War, it was completely 
against contemporary PLA doctrine. It was a limited, offensive, ground-force campaign 
and a monumental disaster for the PLA, although China claimed victory (28).  
 
3 Deng Xiaoping had always been an advocate of state-strengthening economic reforms, a stance that 
placed him at odds with Mao and caused him to lose his job in the CCP twice in less than twenty years. 
Deng sums up his position when he says, “It matters not whether the cat is white or black, only that it 
catches mice.”    
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The war was a military and political humiliation for the PRC. Although the 
numerically superior Chinese forces penetrated about fifty kilometers into Vietnam, the 
much more professional and experienced People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), still flush 
from their struggle against the United States and equipped with modern Soviet and 
American gear, made the PLA pay dearly. The PLA deployed 180,000 soldiers from its 
best front-line units to the war and sustained heavy casualties: approximately 60,000, 
including 26,000 dead (29). The PLA fought against a smaller, numerically weaker 
opponent--75,000-100,000 PAVN border guards and militia; the second stringers. Hanoi 
was, at the time, simultaneously engaged in a war with Cambodia.  
The PLA’s combat performance suffered from poor mobility, weak logistics, and 
obsolete weaponry. Inadequate communications, an unclear chain of command, and the 
lack of military ranks within the PLA also created confusion and adversely affected the 
PRC military’s combat effectiveness. Worse, the PLA’s poor showing against the PAVN 
left the Party and PLA leadership doubtful about the PLA’s effectiveness and utility 
against much more modern and powerful potential opponents, particularly the Soviet 
Union and United States, both of which were perceived by the communist leadership as 
the PRC’s primary adversaries.   
The military modernization program begun in the late 1970s had three major 
focuses. First, the military withdrew from civilian politics and, for the most part, resumed 
its pre-Cultural Revolution political neutrality (30). Deng reestablished civilian control 
over the military by placing his supporters to key military leadership positions, 
minimizing the scope of the PLA's domestic nonmilitary role, and by revitalizing the 
party political structure and ideological control system within the PLA.  
Second, modernization required the reform of military organization, doctrine, 
education and training, and personnel policies to improve combat effectiveness in 
combined-arms warfare. Organizational reforms included creating the state Central 
Military Commission in 1982, streamlining and reducing superfluous PLA forces, 
reorganizing the military regions from eleven to seven, forming group armies, and 
enacting the new Military Service Law in 1984.  
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Doctrine, strategy, and tactics were revised under the rubric of “People's War 
Under Modern Conditions,” which now envisioned a forward defense at selected 
locations near China's borders to prevent attack on Chinese cities and industrial sites, and 
emphasized combined-arms warfare. Reforms in education and training emphasized 
improving the military skills and raising the education levels of officers and enlisted 
soldiers towards the goal of conducting effective modern combined-arms operations. 
New personnel policies required upgrading the quality of PLA recruits and officer 
candidates, improving conditions of service, changing promotion practices to stress 
tactical and technical proficiency instead of political acceptability and reliability, and 
providing new uniforms and insignia.  
The third focus of military modernization was the transformation of the PRC 
defense establishment into a system capable of independently maintaining a modern 
military force. As military expenditures remained relatively constant, reforms 
emphasized reorganizing the defense research-and-development and industrial base to 
more closely integrate civilian and military science, technology and industry. Foreign 
technology was used selectively to upgrade weapons and military equipment. Defense 
industry reforms also helped bring the PRC into the international arms market and 
spurred increased production of civilian goods by defense industries. The overall scale of 
PLA economic activities was minimized, but the military continued to participate in 
infrastructure development projects, and even started a program to provide demobilized 
soldiers with skills useful in the civilian economy. The end goal of PLA modernization 
and professionalization efforts was to create a smaller but harder-hitting force, one that 
was tactically and technically proficient in the use of contemporary modern high-
technology weaponry and equipment, and fully sustainable through indigenous means 
(local research/development/production and revenues generated through foreign sales). 
The creation and development of this more professional, “leaner and meaner” fighting 
force began to become a reality even as the parallel but higher-priority economic reforms 
set in motion by Chairman Deng began to bear fruit and the PRC grew wealthier and 
more able to afford the upgrades.  
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Currently, the PLA numbers 2.3 million men and women (1.6 million in the army 
alone) (31), down from a 1980s peak of 4 million, and commands nearly five percent of 
the PRC’s GDP (approximately 68 billion USD)4. While the vast majority (65-80 
percent) of PLA weaponry and equipment is of 1950s-1960s vintage, newer more modern 
gear has been issued to “core units” of the Chinese military (32) and will eventually, 
quite logically, find its way to other units as it becomes available.  
The modernization and professionalization of the PLA was an essential step 
toward fostering an atmosphere in which dedicated PLA SOF units could emerge and 
evolve. As of the middle to late 1980s, PLA troop strength had decreased by 
approximately a million, but the soldiers were of a higher quality than a decade earlier. 
Military academies for officers and non-commissioned officers had been revived to train 
the PLA’s leadership to command modern forces and as the basis of future promotions in 
the military (33). Basic military training occurred before rather than while soldiers 
arrived in operational units, and technical schools were revived to instruct the young 
enlisted soldiers how to operate and maintain modern hardware. The PLA began to 
regularly rehearse large combined arms operations with combat simulation equipment, 
including laser and electronic scoring devices. Political education was reduced in favor of 
military training; soldiers now spent 20% of their time with political indoctrination and 
80% learning their trade (34). The reforms and de-politicization of the PLA was yielding 
professional, tactically and technically proficient soldiers who were trained to a degree 
previously unknown in the PLA. 
Simultaneously, the creation and development of a more effective PLA--one that 
was envisioned by the PRC leadership as capable of challenging the Soviet Union or 
United States in combat--could not preclude the creation and development of a 
potentially more offensive role for these forces in support of the PRC’s expanding 
strategic prerogatives in the East Asia region (35). A consequent change in the primary 
national military strategy and doctrine governing the PLA’s conduct of warfare was not 
far behind. 
 
4 Estimated FY 2003 figures from the CIA World Fact Book, 
http//www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#Military, April 2005. 
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C. LIMITED LOCAL WAR 
The doctrinal shift from People’s war to Limited Local War in the mid 1980s was 
not a subtle one. It was impelled by the PLA’s ongoing modernization and 
professionalization efforts that helped yield a more effective fighting force than had 
existed a decade previously, and by Chinese military analysts and CMC Chairman Deng 
Xiaoping’s astute perceptions of the future nature of warfare and how such a future 
would affect the PLA’s warfighting strategy. June 1985 was a particularly momentous 
occasion for the future of the PLA. During an extended meeting of the CCP’s CMC, 
leaders and strategic thinkers were tasked to develop a unified vision on the future of 
warfare and establish the direction of consequent military strategies (36). Deng’s 
concluding remarks were telling and reflected his perceptions of the direction he felt the 
PRC’s military and strategy should go:    
There will not be large-scale warfare in the foreseeable future. Factors 
preventing   imminent and large-scale warfare are increasing; such factors 
are: (a) neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has achieved 
advantages in terms of military deployment and therefore prevent either 
side from making the first move; (b) the third world countries are not 
cooperating with these two powers in terms of military deployment, in 
fact, people in the third world countries support peace more than war; (c) 
the importance of technological advantage and sustaining economic 
competition have replaced the importance of sustaining war-winning 
military capability and becoming new contested terrain in world 
competition (37). 
Deng’s remarks reflected the musings of the PRC’s analysts and were influential 
in that they forced Chinese military thinkers to re-evaluate the thirty-year-old strategy of 
People’s War and its scenarios involving large-scale, long-duration purely defensive- 
warfare within the Chinese interior during a period of general war. The Soviet Union and 
United States were still perceived as primary potential threats to the security of the PRC, 
more in the guise of global hegemons and competitors for regional influence than 
potential invaders. Deng Xiaoping and Chinese military analysts took their cues from the 
contemporary direction of the winds of history. The United States was viewed as being 
on the rise by PRC analysts. It had recently concluded a bloody war in Asia that was  
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regional in nature but had come back stronger than ever in the 1980s as reflected in its 
strong and growing economy, and seemingly inexorable military buildup under President 
Reagan (38).  
The Soviet Union was simultaneously perceived as on the decline after its surge 
in national strength and prestige in the 1970s following the victory of Communism in its 
client state, Vietnam. Its planned economy was in a shambles and could not keep pace 
with the apparently endless spending of its primary adversary. Its seemingly formidable 
military was viewed by the PRC as a joke, a “paper tiger,” because of the messy regional 
war of its own making in Afghanistan, its own backyard. It was doing a poor job of 
defeating the “raggedy-assed” Mujahideen guerrillas because of the inherent difficulty in 
adjusting its massive conventional war effort to the vagaries of insurgent warfare, the 
soaring unpopularity of the conflict in the Soviet Union, and the economic drain of the 
war stemming from a fundamental inability of the communist economy to match that of 
its primary Cold war adversary, the United States (39).  
The PRC perceived the world in a state of strategic stalemate. Neither superpower 
had achieved a decisive military advantage in numbers or technology, nuclear or 
conventional, to enable them to successfully attack the other first. Both superpowers 
possessed sufficient arsenals of nuclear weapons and means to deliver them to make any 
seeming quantitative or qualitative advantage a moot point. First Strike and Massive 
Retaliation were just euphemisms for mutual annihilation. The reigning superpowers 
could not attack each other with nuclear weapons and survive, and Soviet conventional 
power in Europe was expected to eventually be countered by American nuclear weapons 
(40).  
The PRC took the view that the developed world had largely been divided up into 
American and Soviet camps but neither superpower was able to exercise sufficient 
influence over the developing world to give either antagonist the significant strategic 
advantage necessary to break the other. The proxy wars and shadow maneuverings 
carried out by both superpowers in the Third World cauldrons of Africa, Latin America, 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East--all regions where the United States and Soviet 
Union jockeyed for influence in order to tip the strategic scales in their favor--had come 
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to naught, with neither side able to gain decisive footing in those regions and the Third 
World as a whole proving largely unsupportive of either alliance’s cause. Most often the 
superpowers were played against each other for the benefit of those regions’ individual 
states. This situation reflected a gradual and general lessening of superpower influence 
worldwide and further lessened the possibility of large-scale or global warfare, but 
opened the door to smaller, equally dangerous regional conflicts fueled by largely local 
tensions.  
The PRC also perceived itself as a potential rising power in the region. It had 
finally achieved normalized diplomatic relations with the United States and much of the 
rest of the world. It was slowly transitioning to a market economy and beginning to reap 
the benefits of plugging into the massive global economic system. It was beginning to 
modernize its armed forces with Western equipment and technology while opening its 
doors to foreign investment (41). It believed that a period of relative peace was at hand, 
during which it could devote increasing time and resources to the national strengthening 
it had begun under Deng’s leadership (42). The PRC was even taking advantage of its 
friendly liaisons with the dominant superpower to strike out at two of its own regional 
adversaries; it allowed the United States to establish surveillance posts on its Western 
border with the Soviet Union and was embroiled in an ugly regional war in Cambodia, 
covertly and overtly aiding Pol Pot’s rebel troops which were fighting against the 
Vietnamese forces that had occupied the country since December 1978 (43).  
The perceptions and observations of Deng and PRC analysts led them to several 
important conclusions that lead directly to the shift in doctrine from People’s War to 
Local Limited War.  
1) Large-scale warfare based solely on the defensive mindset and trading space for 
time within the Chinese interior in order to marshal people and resources for a 
popular war was no longer a viable or desirable strategy for the PRC or even a 
realistic possibility.  
2) Technology and a thriving economy were of primary importance in the execution 
and success of a future war rather than devising a strategy based on a long-
duration conflict. 
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3) Warfare, conventional or nuclear, between the superpowers and their allies was 
discounted as a virtual impossibility because of the strategic stalemate between 
them. 
4) The lessening of superpower influence may have made the world safe from large-
scale global wars, but created a new set of dangers in ethnically, economically 
and territorially provoked regional wars  
The PRC was not immune from these regional wars it foresaw. In Xinjiang, 
Muslim Uighur separatists were perceived as serious threats to Chinese national security, 
as fundamentalists and separatists. Tibetan religious and pro-independence activists were 
giving Beijing fits. The simmering issue of Taiwan and whether diplomacy or war would 
reunite it with the mainland was still uppermost in the minds of PRC military and 
political leaders. People’s War and the defensive mindset behind it would prove 
insufficient to fight the new crop of locally-fueled regional conflicts that the PRC 
perceived as the future of warfare (44).  
Deng believed that a period of comparative and lasting global peace was, if not 
assured, then a good possibility in the near future. He believed that the PRC could use 
that peace to further strengthen the state economically and take advantage of the lucrative 
global economic system to boost China’s prosperity and influence, and, by extension, its 
military power. In this context, Chinese military thinkers and strategists, with some 
prodding from Deng, began to examine and favor smaller-scale, shorter duration 
offensive operations conducted in China’s periphery and regionally during a period of 
comparative peace and national prosperity.  
Local Limited War was the emergent doctrine designed to fight future regional 
wars on China’s peripheries. It signified a fundamental and not subtle shift in the Chinese 
military mindset away from wars of attrition within Chinese borders. Although described 
as “active” defense (45), it was in fact a more offensive doctrine than People’s War, 
signaling a desire by the PRC to possess a power projection capability within a regional 
sphere of conflict. Local Limited War required that the PRC military be able to attack an 
enemy day or night, in all weather conditions during any season up to 600 miles from 
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Chinese borders and coastlines and even permitted pre-emptive surgical strikes against a 
potential adversary to destroy or forestall an attack on the state (46).  
Local Limited War looked good in theory, but it could not be backed up in 
practice. It was a practical impossibility for the PLA when it was initially advanced. The 
doctrine required a plethora of combat capabilities that the PLA neither possessed nor 
could fiscally afford. The forces of the PLA were impressive on paper, but much of the 
hardware and technology was twenty to thirty tears old and, as would later bear out 
during the First Gulf War, wholly inadequate against a determined adversary sporting the 
latest military equipment and technology. Strengthening the PRC economy was given the 
highest priority and it was growing, but not yet robust enough to invest in the types and 
quantity of high-tech tools necessary to make Local Limited War a viable doctrine for the 
PLA.  
An interim power projection capability was required for the PRC military until it 
could develop, purchase or steal the equipment and technology to fully validate Local 
Limited War, and it found a relatively inexpensive solution in the creation and 
development of dedicated SOF. Comparing the relative cost of various tools in the United 
State’s inventory of force projection capabilities against the cost of training and 
equipping an Army Special Forces soldier (Table.1; these are all “out-the-door” costs; 
maintenance, operations, crew and pay costs not included) it is clear that the PRC saw the 
cost-saving merits of SOF as an interim albeit limited force projection capability. In 
essence, the PRC was again sticking with what it knew best, taking advantage of a 
resource that it had in great abundance: manpower. The PRC had not the money, 
technology or qualified personnel (yet) to own and effectively employ the kinds of 
modern power projection gear that would validate Local Limited War. Until it did it 
could own a minimal but effective offensive regional power projection force without 
going broke. From among this better trained and more professional pool of soldiers the 




























Although the PLA was no stranger to special operations it had to go through 
severe doctrinal changes and a concerted modernization and professionalization effort to 
realize the creation and development of a dedicated SOF capability. Maoist-inspired 
People’s War, the bulwark doctrine of the PRC and PLA for almost forty years, was a 
purely defensive strategy that accepted the inevitability of invasion by a more powerful 
enemy, lost territory and a lengthy war of attrition within the Chinese homeland in 
exchange for time and a final military and political victory in the end. It favored heavily 
politically indoctrinated soldiers over militarily adept ones, a condition that persisted 
until the late 1970s and did the PLA no favors regarding the potential creation of 
dedicated SOF units. As primarily offensive entities employing motivated professional 
soldiers, dedicated SOF creation and development within the PLA had to wait until the 
doctrinal and political climate changed.  
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s were the spark that moved the PLA 
towards modernization and professionalization, but, because of the PRC’s predominant 
focus on strengthening the economy, improvements in the PLA took a backseat. Only the 
utter humiliation of the Sino-Vietnam War gave military reforms, primarily 
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modernization and profesionalization, a higher priority than it had had before 1979. 
These modernization and professionalization efforts were the initial elements toward 
creating an atmosphere in which dedicated PLA SOF could emerge and develop.  
Changes in the world climate and within the PRC--particularly the decline of the 
Soviet Union, rise of the United States, overall lessening of superpower influence 
worldwide (especially in the third world) and China’s transition to a market economy-- 
led Deng and PRC analysts to correctly surmise that future conflicts would revolve 
around local tensions within a regional context and be won on the strength of technology 
and economic vigor. The PRC’s attempt to address the future emergence of these regional 
conflicts lead to a fundamental doctrinal shift away from the purely defensive represented 
by People’s War and toward a more offensive stance as postulated by Limited Local War. 
Because Limited Local War required the projection of power at a considerable distance 
beyond China’s own borders and coastline, and the PRC had not the money, equipment 
or technological base to back the doctrine, it fell back on a relatively cost-effective 
manpower solution, dedicated SOF units, as an interim though limited force projection 
tool. 
The creation of the experimental dedicated SOF unit in the Guangzhou Military 
Region was certainly a start, but hardly enough. The First Gulf War was an ugly lesson to 
the PRC as to how far its military machine had to go to catch up to the rest of the modern 
world. As the Sino-Vietnamese war had forced the PLA into a serious modernization and 
professionalization effort, the First Gulf War had the same effect on dedicated PLA SOF 











































III. THE FIRST GULF WAR AND PLA SOF 
If the Sino-Vietnamese War was a humiliating lesson for the PLA in “what was,” 
the First Gulf War was equally embarrassing and every bit as instructive in “what could 
be.” The experiences and lessons from China’s 1979 debacle with its Southeast Asian 
neighbor galvanized the PRC into assigning a greater priority to the modernization and 
professionalization of its military forces and created the appropriate military and political 
conditions for the eventual creation of dedicated PLA SOF. In a like manner, the lessons 
and observations PLA analysts took away from the First Gulf War were essential to 
spurring the creation, development and expansion of PLA SOF units and shaping the 
trajectory of their development, especially regarding specific capabilities the PLA though 
that they should have. 
 
A. CREATION OF PLA SOF 
The genesis of PLA SOF in 1988 occurred at a critical juncture in PRC history. 
Economically, the nation was beginning to reap the benefits of a market economy; it was 
looking outward instead of inward and had a military strategy to match, one that 
emphasized war beyond China’s national boundaries, though it had not yet acquired the 
hardware or infrastructure to back it up. The ongoing professionalization of the PLA was 
developing different soldiers than those under Mao, ones that were tactically and 
technically proficient and rewarded for being so instead of PRC-friendly, politically 
reliable cannon fodder.  
The PLA was also in the unique position of being able to learn from the 
experiences of its primary adversaries. Both American and Soviet modern SOF forces 
had initially been designed, created and developed to support large-scale conventional 
operations. American SOF were tasked with cultivating guerrilla forces behind enemy 
lines in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe, conducting raids on vital targets and 
reconnoitering/clearing beaches for amphibious landings. Soviet SOF units were detailed 
primarily to seek and destroy American tactical nuclear launch and C2 facilities in 
Europe in prelude to a Soviet conventional attack (47). Both American and Soviet SOF 
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eventually found use as alternatives to utilizing conventional forces to fight low-intensity, 
regional or ‘small’ wars. American SOF came into its own in the low-intensity regional 
conflict role during the Vietnam War, training indigenous peoples to resist the Viet Cong 
and PAVN while launching lightning-fast raids and ambushes against enemy lines of 
communication and supply. The American SOF community continued its legacy during 
follow-on conflicts in Latin America, where they were wildly successful in the 1980s, 
particularly in El Salvador and Honduras where they helped both states stave off 
Communist insurgencies (48). Soviet SOF blossomed in the low-intensity conflict role in 
a similar manner. The Soviet Union sent SPETSNAZ advisors to Angola and South 
Africa during the 1970s and 80s to train and support Communist guerrillas in those states, 
and deployed SOF teams to Afghanistan to counter the deadly Mujahideen fighters 
wreaking havoc on their conventional forces (49).  
With the lessons of foreign SOF to follow and similar capabilities in mind, the 
first experimental dedicated Special Operations Force (SOF), a unit of specially selected 
soldiers that were trained to conduct special operations tasking on a full-time basis during 
times of national peace or war, was created in the Guangzhou Military Region in 1988. 
This SOF unit was designed and trained to support the contemporary doctrine of Local 
Limited War by serving as a limited and relatively inexpensive alternative to modern 
high-tech force projection tools that the PRC did not have at the time. The long-range 
fighter-bombers, aerial refueling tankers, precision land and sea attack missiles, modern 
C4ISR and aircraft carriers….all were prohibitively expensive for a 1980s PRC making 
its first tentative steps into a market economy and towards economic prosperity. All 
would have to wait (but not much longer) until the PRC was economically strong enough 
to afford them in quantity and the crews had been trained to operate them. 
 
B. THE FIRST GULF WAR AND LOCAL WAR UNDER HIGH TECH 
CONDITIONS 
The First Gulf War added another layer, the emphasis on a high-technology 
combat capability, to the doctrine and strategy of Local Limited War and shaped the 
trajectory of development that PLA SOF would assume in the future. The PLA studied 
 29
the United State’s First Gulf War and found the lessons educational if disturbing. The 
large Iraqi armed forces, a major recipient of PRC military assistance and its largely 
outmoded hardware (50), had been handily destroyed in sixty days by the Coalition’s 
high-tech forces that had been massed in the Persian Gulf and launched blitzkrieg-style 
against Iraq and enemy targets in Kuwait. It was brutally apparent in to the PRC and PLA 
in 1985 that their six-year-old doctrine of Local Limited War could not be supported by 
their current equipment inventory of 1950s and 1960s hardware (51). It would likely 
prove ineffective against a determined high-technology adversary, a fact driven home by 
the relative ease with which the American-led Coalition force’s high-technology war 
machine ground down the Chinese-equipped Iraqi armed forces.  
The PRC had a brace of regional high-tech and semi high-tech states with which 
to potentially contend. Russia was an economic disaster, but its war machine was second 
only to that of the United States in technological development, training and potency. 
Taiwan and South Korea were economically prosperous and armed to the teeth with the 
best gear that the United States could provide, and their troops well trained and motivated 
(52). Japan’s small “self-defense” forces were also equipped with modern American 
military hardware and the requisite skills to use them effectively. India, Pakistan and the 
Southeast Asian states were all in the midst of modernizing their own forces as quickly as 
their respective economies would permit.  
Study of the First Gulf War lead PRC and PLA analysts to several important 
conclusions:   
1) Advanced technology was an essential key in the strategic and tactical success of 
any war that the PRC might fight. Technology allowed the Coalition forces to 
effectively attack the Iraqi military day or night, in all weather conditions 
regardless of the time of year, and in any environmental or terrain condition (53). 
Laser, infrared and electro-optically steered precision-guided munitions launched 
from airborne, seaborne and even land-based platforms increased Coalition 
weapon delivery accuracy against point Iraqi targets while decreasing collateral 
damage. Stealth aircraft penetrated Iraqi air defenses under cover of darkness and 
a cloak of electronic invisibility with relative impunity to accurately bomb key 
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Iraqi C2 targets. Coalition armored vehicles equipped with global positioning 
system receivers navigated the open desert where the Iraqi army feared to tread, 
and destroyed Soviet-made Iraqi T-72s and Chinese-built T-55s with long-range 
wire and laser guided missiles and depleted-uranium ordnance. Advanced air and 
space-based C2 systems gave Coalition forces an accurate picture of the 
battlespace to more effectively locate and dispatch their adversaries.  
2) Short, sharp regional wars like the First Gulf War were useful to achieving 
political ends while rendering large-scale warfare unnecessary. The United State’s 
influence and power were enhanced at home and abroad, even among Arab 
nations, by seeking a global Coalition against Iraq. By abiding by the letter of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 678, (54) which stipulated 
only that Iraqi forces be ejected from Kuwait and ‘peace be restored to the 
region’--even though some American military leaders wanted to push on into Iraq 
and take Baghdad--the war was confined to the immediate region, and did not 
threaten to spill over and involve “hostile” Arab nations or Iraq’s other primary 
patron, the Soviet Union. It also ensured that the rare and fragile alliance that had 
been brokered among several Arab states in direct support of the war (even Syria 
sent troops) would be maintained (55), lending an additional air of legitimacy to 
the war and further reducing its possibility of escalating beyond the immediate 
region. 
3) High-tech warfare offered the possibility of bringing conflicts to a rapid 
conclusion. Coalition forces ruthlessly exercised Information Warfare (IW) 
dominance over the enemy, rapidly snuffing its C2 system with precision attacks 
one target at a time until the Iraqi military was left blind, deaf and without 
effective command and control of its forces. The overall faster pace and 
relentlessness of Coalition kinetic operations took the Iraqis by surprise. Attacks 
on infrastructure and battlefield targets occurred around the clock regardless of 
weather conditions, quickly reducing the Iraqi war machine until only the shaken 
remnants were left to surrender four days following the opening of the ground 
campaign--sixty days after hostilities began.   
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The First Gulf War more than anything else drove home the reality of the strategic 
pickle in which the PLA found itself. If the United States and its allies could reduce the 
large, Chinese-equipped Iraqi military to scrap in two furious months with relative ease 
and few casualties, it could potentially do the same to the PLA should the strategic or 
political need arise. The PRC’s numerical superiority in troops and equipment might even 
prove negligible or, worse, inadequate against the more technologically-developed armed 
forces of its regional competitors in the event of a conflict with them. The lessons of the 
First Gulf War influenced the PRC and PLA to again modify military doctrine and 
strategy to Local War Under High-Tech Conditions. Under the new doctrine, the 
technological development of the PLA assumed a renewed importance. Russia and Israel 
supplied much of the equipment and technology to the PLA, as did, prior to the post-
Tiananmen Square arms embargo, Europe and the United States. Under Local War Under 
High-Tech Conditions, high-tech combat power was concentrated in core PLA units. 
These core units, which Western observers called “pockets of excellence” (POEs), 
received the best equipment, technology and training to provide the PLA with local 
superiority over its enemies within a relatively small war zone in order to overwhelm its 
adversaries and resolve regional conflicts quickly. More importantly, this new doctrine 
was a tacit acknowledgement by the PLA of its desire to make itself into a modern high-
tech force and its relative inferiority as a whole when compared to its potential 
competitors (56).           
The PRC and PLA were particularly impressed by the Coalition’s SOF 
contingents that participated in the First Gulf War. Coalition SOF had been assigned a 
number of missions. Special Forces teams trained Saudi and Free Kuwati forces in a 
number of “technical areas.” A number of Saudis had completed BUD/S training and 
eventually formed the core of three Saudi SEAL teams while United States Navy SEALs 
helped reconstitute the Kuwati Navy after the Iraqi invasion and train the Saudi Navy in 
fast-boat operations. Coalition SOF units conducted CSAR, the 16th Special Operations 
Squadron flying MH-53J Pave Low helicopters up to 130 miles into Iraq to rescue 
downed aircrew. Coalition SOF units designated targets for Coalition PGMs, executed 
Special Reconnaissance (SR) of terrain and routes of advance toward the Iraqi border and 
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conducted Direct Action (DA) strikes against vital C2 targets behind Iraqi lines. Special 
Forces teams helped the Saudi combat engineers clear safe lanes through Iraqi minefields 
on land; EOD and SEAL teams cleared mines at sea in preparation for a potential 
amphibious landing (57).  
Coalition SOF was most well remembered for a relatively small but strategically 
important and politically high-visibility role. They were unleashed behind enemy lines to 
hunt for the Iraqi mobile and fixed SCUD launchers that rained missiles on Israel and 
Saudi Arabia. The military value of the Coalition SOF SCUD hunt was negligible. The 
SCUD was a notoriously inaccurate weapon with a Circular Error of Probability (CEP) 
measured in hundreds of meters. It constituted little military threat when launched as 
sporadically and in as few numbers as they were (58). Additionally, later analysis 
revealed that many of the targets located and destroyed by Coalition SOF and air strikes, 
although purportedly SCUDs and their TELs, were actually clever decoys--fuel tanker 
trucks, mockups and such. Politically, the SCUD hunting campaign was valuable in that 
it showed the Israeli government, which had threatened to attack Iraq directly if the 
SCUDs kept falling, that the Coalition was doing something about the big missiles hitting 
their country. The Coalition SOF SCUD hunting campaign helped smooth Israel’s ruffled 
feathers and kept them from attacking Iraq and upsetting the delicate alliance and 
consensus the United States had built with the Arab states against Iraq (59). These were 
capabilities and missions that interested the PLA, and eventually shaped the development 
and composition of current PLA SOF. 
 
C. PLA SOF OVERVIEW 
The PLA was in a unique position to study and learn from the capabilities, 
equipment, methods and operations of dedicated SOF worldwide. They chose to model 
their “special-mission POEs” largely on American SOF, partly because the data on them 
was easily accessible and partly because of the seemingly widespread and constant 




Gulf War, the PLA was influenced in large part by the past U.S. experiences in Southeast 
Asia, Iran and Latin America (most recently, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq--
again).  
Because of Local Limited War’s emphasis on a short conflict, PLA SOF 
development eschewed the Special Forces-style Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission 
and its focus on a protracted all-aspect war in favor of the purely kinetic and military 
aspects of DA and SR that were observed during Operation Desert Storm. Consequently, 
PLA SOF appears to look more like pre-Vietnam War American SOF in its composition 
and focus. Their capabilities are more akin to those of American Ranger and SEAL teams 
in their dominant emphasis on DA and SR (61). In fact, although PLA SOF units were 
modeled on the American example, there is similarity to the Russian SPETSNAZ model. 
PLA SOF’s focus areas of DA and SR and the PLA’s contemporary doctrinal emphasis 
on striking hard and fast at an adversary on a limited front to achieve relative superiority 
and a quick end seems like former-Soviet doctrine on a smaller scale, which sought a 
swift end to hostilities by attacking hard and fast over a broad front (62). SPETSNAZ 
forces also disregarded the American-type UW mission in favor of SOF units that could 
slash at the enemy’s vulnerable areas in support of a quickly ended war in Europe. The 
Soviets were caught flat-footed in Afghanistan because of their lack of a force, special or 
otherwise, that was capable of effectively contending with a full-spectrum (military, 
political, social, cultural and economic factors) threat like the resulting Afghan 
insurgency that followed their 1979 invasion (63), while American Special Forces 
successfully used their UW experience to prevail against Communist encroachment in 
Latin America during the 1980s.   
PLA SOF units are collectively referred to as special operations dadu which may 
denote a force of varying size, from a regiment down to a battalion (64). Unlike the 
American example, PLA SOF is under the direct command and control of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) (65), the overarching organization that gives the various 
branches of the PLA their marching orders. This direct control of the military is a 
throwback to the post-Soviet pullout from the PRC in the late 1950s, when the CCP 
feared a loss of control over and loyalty of the military. Because the CCP uses the PLA as 
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a domestic and external security apparatus it must retain and maintain direct control over 
the PLA. Consequently, there is no unified SOF command structure within the PLA 
comparable to USSOCOM, no senior SOF advocate (General or Admiral-type) to address 
the specific interests and requirements of PLA SOF and task it effectively. CCP leaders 
who may or may not have an idea of their SOF elements’ capabilities are free to employ 
these units as they see fit, leaving them vulnerable to potential abuse and misuse. 5  
Also, unlike the American SOF example, PLA SOF does not operate an integral 
SOF mission-trained transportation asset like the 16th Special Operations Squadron, 160th 
SOAR, HCS-4 or Special Boat Unit. With the exception of infiltrating a target area on 
foot, PLA SOF must coordinate operations closely with their army, navy and air force 
brethren in order to deploy on a mission. They are dependent on and at the mercy of 
aircraft and aircrew that may, but more likely are not be able to fulfill their unique 
deployment and infiltration requirements (66). In essence, what the PRC currently has is 
equivalent to the American SOF situation prior to the creation of a unified command 
structure, when dissimilar units and non-SOF elements were thrown together to conduct a 
mission on the fly, sometimes with disastrous results (SOG missions in Cambodia, and 
the failed rescue attempt in Iran, Operation Rice Bowl). PLA SOF is still a young force. 
These discrepancies may actually get fixed as China acquires greater proficiency and 
experience at special operations, and gets the inevitable black eye from a failed exercise 
in power projection. Maybe the PLA will learn faster.  
Like American SOF organizations, PLA SOF is often on the leading edge of 
technological and tactical innovation within the Chinese military and receives the best 
most sophisticated equipment that the PRC can produce, buy or steal (67). PLA SOF 
units were among the very first to receive and use the new Type 95 5.8mm modular 
weapon system. 6 Designed as the next generation in Chinese small-arms, the Type 95 is 
a compact bullpup-style weapon that can serve as an assault rifle and squad machine gun. 
With quick barrel changes, it can downsize to a sub-machinegun or upgrade to a sniper 
 
5 Operational and C2 mistakes during the invasion of Grenada precipitated and eventually lead to the creation of 
the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the overarching special operations command 
authority, in 1987.  
6 The Hong Kong Garrison was the first unit issued this weapon, followed by PLA SOF.  
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rifle (68). PLA SOF units also routinely employ the PPC (Powered Parachute) vehicle. A 
backpack device which is almost as light and quiet as a traditional parachute but can take 
off under its own power, the PPC can carry a soldier with a full combat load and infiltrate 
up to forty-five miles behind enemy lines at 11-21 miles per hour. PLA SOF units have 
also been conducting trials with the ASN-15 ‘backpack’ UAV, a miniature surveillance 
vehicle similar in size and concept to the American Silver Fox UAV, that can give SOF 
teams discrete “over the next hill” battlefield intelligence (69).  
PLA SOF units make extensive use of specialized gear like night vision goggles, 
low-light level vision equipment and portable GPS equipment to help give themselves a 
qualitative edge over their more conventionally equipped opposition. They also use 
standard and modified versions of the equipment and weapons designed for conventional 
forces to meet their own unique mission requirements, such as suppressed weapons and 
short-barreled, folding-stock variants of standard PLA-inventory assault rifles.  
PLA SOF units do not have integral airborne or seaborne transportation 
capabilities (yet), but, like their American counterparts, can deploy to and infiltrate their 
mission areas via rotary and fixed-winged aviation assets, surface vessels and 
submarines, vehicular land transportation, and good old-fashioned leg power. The PRC is 
even experimenting with high-speed Wing In Ground (WIG) as a means to transport 
troops and equipment (70). With a potential top speed of 300 knots and an altitude of 
between three and ninety feet, the WIG could prove an ideal vehicle to stealthily deploy 
and infiltrate PLA SOF units under the electronic eyes of a regional adversary and onto 
their coastline.     
A proficient SOF operator cannot be grown easily or overnight, so, like their 
American counterparts, PLA SOF units conduct necessarily lengthy, difficult and realistic 
training; initial training for the Sword of Southern China SOF unit assigned to the 
Guangzhou Military Region, a “SEAL-type unit” which specializes in amphibious 
operations, lasts three years (71). PLA SOF training is similar in scope and focus to that 
of SOF worldwide in that it emphasizes deft proficiency in various battlefield tasks and 
adaptability to a wide range of combat contingencies. They are rapidly deployable--one 
unit based in Beijing can be airborne within two minutes of its activation order--and 
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apparently train and practice for combat situations on a scenario-driven basis in order to 
more effectively tailor their actions to unforeseen circumstances.  
They are very proficient in small-arms handling, as intimately familiar with their 
own personal and force inventory weapons as they are with those from foreign countries. 
PLA SOF units emphasize superior physical fitness in its soldiers. Candidates and unit 
personnel have a difficult physical fitness regimen that consists of activities familiar to 
SOF worldwide--push-ups, sit ups, pull-ups, timed runs and swims--and stuff that has yet 
to see the light of day outside of the PRC (three-mile, twenty-five minute runs with sacks 
of bricks around the shoulders, a “six-mile dash” with two handfuls of grenades and 
sandbags around the legs, and “iron sand” exercises to build hardness on the hands and  
head (72)). All PLA SOF units are trained in airborne operations, all-weather and 
day/night operations, multiple-environment (desert, cold weather, jungle, mountain, 
urban) (73) operations and survival, and the martial arts.  
Personnel from each unit are likely to have additional, more in-depth training in 
one or more specialty areas including UAV operations and handling, combat medicine, 
amphibious and maritime operations, demolitions, various types and modes of 
communications, computers (both foreign and domestic) and foreign languages, 
particularly English and those of other potential adversaries. Next to North Korea, which 
is estimated to possess 100,000 SOF operators (74), the PRC owns the largest SOF 
contingent in Asia, with between 25,000 and 30,000 SOF troops at its disposal, and have 
been collectively described as “hawks in the sky, dragons in the sea and tigers on land” 
by the Chinese media.  
 
1. PLA Special Forces    
The largest SOF force in the Chinese military, PLA Special Forces (PLASF) may 
number as many as 25,000 operators divided among the PRC’s seven military regions 
(75). PLASF units are organized into dadu roughly equivalent in dimension and 
organization to a standard PLA army regiment, with over a thousand operators organized 
into three battalions, each with its own headquarters and support unit. Their operations 
are usually predicated on and designed around small-unit actions. PLASF units actually 
appear to combine the capabilities and intent of American Ranger and SEAL teams (76); 
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their shooters are proficient and routinely operate in both land and maritime 
environments and have been known to execute some missions in company strength (77). 
They’re designed to perform a wide variety of often hazardous mission profiles (but not 
UW) and extensively trained and skilled to a degree that allows them a reasonable chance 
of success when compared to the numbers and mass that might be required for a 
conventional unit to achieve a similar victory. Each of China’s seven Military Regions 
possesses at least one army SOF dadu, and they all have properly fierce-sounding names-
-a unit based out of the Nanjing Military Region is named “The Flying Dragons,” one of 
Guangzhou “The Sword of Southern China” (78).  
To date, the primary focus of PLASF lies within three core areas of competency: 
DA, SR and Information Warfare (IW). For DA missions, defined for the purposes of 
PLASF as “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive activities,” the PLASF 
unit team tasked with the assault will deploy a contingent requisite to mission success. 
PLASF are highly proficient at working in teams of eight to sixteen familiar to American 
SOF but may also assign upwards of a hundred operators to a DA mission (79). Under 
the umbrella of DA, PLASF practice and perform raids on vital enemy-held positions that 
would require greater conventional army mass to accomplish, prisoner and hostage rescue 
from positions behind enemy lines and in denied areas, the capture of valuable enemy 
personnel from secure areas, and counter terrorism operations in a manner similar to 
Army SFOD-D and Navy DEVGRU. PLA SOF DA objectives run the logical gamut of 
critical battlefield and rear-area targets and likely include but are not limited to, enemy 
command posts (both in forward and rear areas), airfields and bridges vital to the success 
of follow-on conventional forces, tactical and strategic weapons of mass destruction, and 
key weapons systems that might pose a danger to friendly forces such as air-defense sites 
and coastal missile batteries. 
PLASF-style SR is largely an element of necessity. Driven by the PRC’s 
technological inferiority to American electronic reconnaissance and surveillance systems 
and China’s historical bent toward effective HUMINT collection, PLA SOF SR missions 
emphasize extensive and detailed eyes-on reconnaissance of targets of interest by human 
assets (80). Operating in teams of two to eight, PLASF SR contingents are very proficient 
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and extremely good at what they do. The practice and execution of PLASF SR involves 
the acquisition of information of national or theater-level significance encompassing the 
enemy in general and its disposition on the battlefield and in its rear areas, weather and 
terrain behind enemy lines in preparation for immediate or future infiltration/invasion, 
locations of enemy command posts, reserves, weapons of mass destruction, key weapons 
systems and logistic sites in order to gather targeting data and build profiles of critical 
targets for assaults or strikes, especially for precision-guided weapons systems (PLASF 
SR teams on the ground may also provide terminal guidance for precision-guided 
munitions (81)), and possible river-crossing sites and avenues of approach for follow-on 
conventional forces.  
The PLASF IW mission ties directly to the PLA doctrine and strategy of Local 
War Under High-Tech Conditions. The PLASF IW mission attempts to blind and confuse 
an enemy force through cutting off its means of command and control. It may actually be 
considered a subset of the DA mission in that it seeks to seize the initiative in a fast-
moving, short-duration regional conflict by directly attacking an enemy’s C4ISR assets 
with PLASF forces. The PLASF IW mission, much like SR, is an expression of the 
Chinese armed forces’ weaknesses in electronic warfare technology when compared 
against its potential foes, and an attempt to address them with a relatively cost-effective 
manpower solution (82). These missions range the gamut between dropping a SOF 
assault unit directly on top of C2 nodes and physically destroying them and/or 
eliminating their personnel, to deploying SOF units equipped with portable, low-powered 
electronic warfare gear close enough to intercept, locate and/or jam enemy electronic 
systems (83). 
 
2. PLA Marine Corps SOF 
The PLA Marine Corps itself is a conventional force, equipped with armor, 
artillery and hovercraft, and consists of two brigades of 6,000-7,000 soldiers each. The 
smallest PLA SOF contingent, PLA Marine Corp SOF numbers an estimated 1,500 
operators--roughly four battalions, or dadu, of 300-400 soldiers--distributed among both 
brigades (84). Their mission within the PLA Marine Corps is twofold and their personnel 
are separated accordingly. Each brigade owns a single dadu of SOF marines and a single 
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dadu of special amphibious reconnaissance (SAR) marines. The SOF marines are very 
similar to American Force Marine Reconnaissance units in tactics and doctrine in that 
their shooters are trained to operate amphibiously, but are primarily detailed to infiltrate 
ashore under cover of darkness prior to an amphibious landing to gather important 
operational level intelligence for the amphibious force commander (SR) and to neutralize 
key targets ashore in preparation and support of an amphibious landing (DA) (85). They 
conduct operations with as few as two soldiers and as many as the entire battalion of 
them. It is not inconceivable that SOF marines SR and DA missions would also overlap 
or mirror those of their PLA brethren, or that they could also have an amphibiously-
oriented IW mission to fulfill in support of a landing force.  
The SAR marines are entirely different. They are very comparable to the defunct 
United States Navy Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) in that its operators are trained 
in firearms handling and some aspects of land warfare and battlefield tactics, but are 
primarily detailed to conduct hydrographic surveys and underwater/beach reconnaissance 
(SR), and clear hazardous obstacles (mines, “dragon’s teeth”) prior to an amphibious 
assault (86). Like SEALs and UDTs before them, SAR marines most often conduct 
operations in platoon strength and routinely practice “locking out” of submarines via its 
torpedo tubes (87). 
 
3. PLAAF Airborne SOF 
The 15th PLAAF (PLA Air Force) Airborne Corps, composed of three brigades of 
8,000-10,000 soldiers each, is also a largely conventional force. It is equipped with its 
own light armored vehicles, light towed artillery and attached anti-chemical warfare 
units, and appears capable of conducting operations of regimental size within a 600 mile 
radius of departure (88). It has its own SOF units, though very little is known about them. 
Their size and composition remain speculative, but PLAAF SOF reportedly has “several” 
dadu (battalions) of 400-500 operators. These forces specialize exclusively in DA, 
specifically seizing airfields and port facilities for follow on airborne, amphibious and 
PLA units, and attacking enemy headquarters facilities and C2 assets by air assault (89). 
The latter specialty would seem to assume that there is an entailed IW mission built into 
PLAAF SOF capabilities. These units deploy and insert primarily via fixed and rotary-
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winged assets--either as air-mobile forces or parachutists--but also routinely use the PPC 
to infiltrate to their mission areas. This dadu has been described by the Chinese media as 
“a sharp knife against the enemy’s HQ” (90). 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The First Gulf War in 1991 had a similar effect on the creation and development 
of PLA SOF to the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979 on the PLA as a whole. As the latter event 
forced the PLA to modernize and professionalize to address shortcomings in the PRC’s 
national defense and its doctrine, the former opened the PLA’s eyes as to how far the 
PLA had to catch up with the modern world to validate its doctrine of Local Limited 
War. The creation of the first dedicated SOF unit in the PLA occurred during a very 
fortuitous time for the PRC. Its brand-new market economy was on the brink of 
exploding onto the global scene; it had a new generation of soldiers who were tactically 
and technically proficient enough to train as dedicated SOF operators, and a government 
and military politically inclined to permit its armed forces had almost forty years of 
foreign, particularly American, SOF experience from which to draw and acquire useful 
lessons. An atmosphere existed within the PRC and PLA in which dedicated SOF forces 
could be created and developed and their place within contemporary doctrine realized.    
The First Gulf War offered a brace of new lessons to the PRC and PLA, chief 
among them being that high-tech warfare was the wave of the future and that their 
country was woefully unprepared for it. PRC and PLA used these new lessons to fine 
tune their modernization effort, modifying their doctrine to Local War Under High Tech 
Conditions and focusing on building superiority and strength into the PLA not military-
wide (which was cost-prohibitive) but through well-trained, well-equipped and hard-
hitting POE’s which would ideally break a regional adversary on a limited front fast 
enough to bring conflicts to a rapid close.  
Influenced by American SOF and their missions and performance during the First 
Gulf War, PLA SOF was situated to benefit from and proliferate because of the change in 
doctrine and emphasis on high technology warfare. It was the PRC special mission POE 
and power-projection tool. PLA SOF gets the best gear and weaponry first. They are 
trained to an exacting degree to enable them to infiltrate their mission areas, then strike 
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hard and fast and ultimately succeed at a task that would require a much larger number of 
conventional troops. Overall, dedicated PLA SOF units appear very capable and 
formidable. They do have glaring shortcomings. These forces are still a tool of the Party 
with no ‘face’ in the PRC leadership. Lest they travel by foot, PLA SOF units cannot 
travel or deploy by themselves. The former problem is political, the latter doctrinal and 
probably financial. Both are fixable. PLA SOF is still a relatively young force and will, 
much like America’s SOF units, doubtless suffer tragic failures because of its current 
shortcomings.  
For the present being, PLA SOF is just what the PRC wants. It is an interim and 
relatively inexpensive (though limited) power projection tool that the PRC can use while 
it continues to slowly modernize and acquire more conventional, expensive and 
technologically advanced power projection capabilities (long-range fighter-bombers, 
nuclear submarines, aerial refueling, modern C4ISR). PLA SOF’s emphasis on DA, SR 
and IW make it directly attributable to the contemporary doctrine of Local War Under 



























































IV. PLA SOF AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
PLA SOF is a tool for limited regional power projection, designed to strike fast, 
hard and precisely at an enemy in accordance with the doctrine of Local War Under High 
Tech Conditions. This being the case, perhaps DA, SR and IW are the only missions that 
PLA SOF units realistically need to assume in support of contemporary doctrine. Given 
what the PRC seeks to achieve in the Asia region, do the current PLA SOF mission areas 
coincide with overall PRC ambitions, desires and strategy? Is there an American Special 
Forces-style Unconventional Warfare mission for PLA SOF contingents in the future. 
Would such a mission support the PRC’s strategic goals? Those are the questions that this 
chapter attempts to answer. 
 
A. PRC STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
What does the PRC seek to achieve for itself in the Asia region? Simply, China 
seeks to become the dominant regional player in Asian affairs without assuming the 
unwieldy mantle of a hegemonic power (like its current rival the United States) or 
conferring it on anyone else, or necessarily having to conduct military operations to 
achieve its goals. As the regional power, it would like to dominate economic, military 
and political affairs in Asia and, if not completely edge out the United States, its primary 
rival in the region, then at least have a firmer hand and more influence there than the 
United States (91).  
The PRC has always taken a realist approach to international politics and played a 
balance of power game since the 1950s. When the former Soviet Union and the United 
States were perceived as enemies in the 1960s, China sought to create its sphere of 
influence around an alliance of weaker states as a way to offset the power of both. Then 
China allied with the United States against the Soviet Union during the 70s and early 80s 
when it appeared that Soviet power was ascendant (92). The end of the Cold War and 
demise of the Soviet Union have left the United States in uncontested command of the 
field as the world’s sole superpower. The international pervasiveness of American 
influence and global spread of American power have placed the United States into the 
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position of hegemon. Beijing resists hegemony--especially when it interferes with 
Chinese national and international interests--believing it an impediment to global peace 
and prosperity because of the propensity for nations to fight over or resist it (93). Even 
now, as the PRC takes a “softer” line and seeks to garner favor and influence in the 
global community through multilateralism (or, at least, bilateralism) with weak and 
strong states and the world forum of the United Nations, it is still, at heart, playing a 
variation on the balance of power game to offset the power and influence of the current 
hegemonic power. Chinese multilateral and bilateral strategic partnerships with its 
regional neighbors are attempts by Beijing to develop alliances and liaisons that are 
powerful enough--economically, politically and military--to offset the effects and reality 
of regional and global (though gradually slipping) American hegemony (94).  
The PRC and United States are more economically interdependent than ever. 
Currently the PRC conducts 40 percent of its foreign trade with the United States, a state 
of affairs that will continue for the foreseeable future as long as both parties find the 
arrangement profitable. China, however, also wants to expand and grow stronger. Its own 
economy is expanding and getting stronger to the tune of eight percent per year and will 
continue to do so until at least 2010, by which time its GDP will top US $2.3 trillion. 
Between 2001 and 2005 the disposable per capita income of urban and rural citizens rose 
by 9.2 and 5.2 percent, respectively (95). The quality of life in China is better than it has 
ever been and is improving, as proved by the rise and continued growth of a Chinese 
middle class and consumerism in the PRC.  People are routinely buying what were 
perceived as luxury goods two decades ago. By the end of 2003, 112 million more 
Chinese citizens had telephone lines for a total of 532 million telephone subscribers 
nationwide (96). There are approximately 20 million cars (the surest indicator of personal 
consumerism, next to houses) motoring the roads of the PRC today, a number estimated 
to grow sevenfold by 2020.  
This continued growth and prosperity comes at a heavy strategic cost; fueling this 
massive and hungry economy requires a constant flow of natural resources, much of 
which China must look beyond its borders to acquire. Prior to 1993, the PRC was a net 
exporter of oil. Today, it is a net importer (China will import over 140 million tons of oil 
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by this year’s end (97)) and last year overtook its regional neighbor, Japan, as the second 
largest oil importer and consumer in the entire world behind the United States. China, one 
of the world’s top steel producers, must even import 30 million tons of steel annually to 
stay ahead of the growing economy and insatiable production and industrial demands 
(98). This situation in which the PRC finds itself will not improve. The so-called 
‘peaceful rise’7 of China is a misnomer in the age of decreased resources, particularly oil, 
and increased demand for those resources to fuel exploding economies. As China’s 
economy and wealth grows, its demand for resources to fuel them will increase and it will 
have to acquire those resources somehow if it seeks to continue growing.  
The increasing scarcity of resources necessary for national growth and survival 
indicates that Beijing will eventually have to expand and acquire these resources at the 
expense of other established and needy economies and consumers, specifically, of the 
current hegemonic power (and dominant consumer) and its regional neighbors. China 
seeks to couch its insatiable hunger for economy and energy-feeding resources as an 
appeal to its regional neighbors to help economize their energy consumption for the good 
of the global economy, as when Hu Jintao asserted during his speech to APEC leaders in 
November 2004:  
We should work hard to bring about substantive results of the new round 
of WTO negotiations at an early date, cut back on our differences and 
frictions, and create an equitable and win-win environment for trade and 
investment. Given the vital importance of energy to economic 
development, we should work together to keep the world energy market 
stable. I hereby propose that APEC step up efforts in the energy field, 
conduct policy dialogue and deepen cooperation among members in the 
areas of improving energy efficiency, developing alternative sources of 
energy and providing affordable energy products to the poor. (99) 
Currently, Chinese alliance-building in the region lays much greater emphasis on 
shared economic strength and prosperity and strong regional economic interdependence 
instead of political or military collaboration. Deng Xiaoping started the push towards 
Chinese economic strength and prosperity in the late 1970s with the Four Modernizations 
and the difficult but bold move toward creating a Chinese market economy that could 
 
7 Theory advanced in which China grows and prospers without directly opposing or downgrading to 
influence and power of its rivals. 
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take advantage of the of the growing regional and global economies. His legacy was 
carried on by his successor, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, current leader of the PRC. Make 
no mistake, China wants to take the lead in regional economic affairs, and, as the largest 
country in the region, it is fully capable of doing so. The PRC also realizes that its own 
prosperity is the key to regional prosperity (100). Excerpts from Hu Jintao’s keynote 
speech during the April 2004 Boao Forum for Asia provides insight as to direction the 
PRC wants to take the Chinese nation and the region:  
We have already set a clear goal for the first 20 years of this century. 
Namely, in building a well-off society of a higher standard in an all-round 
way for the benefit of well over one billion Chinese people, we will 
quadruple the 2000 GDP to 4 trillion US dollars with a per capita GDP of 
3,000 US dollars, further develop the economy, improve democracy, 
advance science and education, enrich culture, foster greater social 
harmony and upgrade the texture of life for the people. 
China is an Asian country. China's development is closely related to Asia's 
prosperity. China has and will continue to make a positive impact on Asia 
in the area of development. A developing China generates important 
opportunities for Asia. 
China's development injects fresh vigor to regional cooperation in Asia. 
China has been extensively involved in the various mechanisms of Asia-
based regional cooperation, emphasizing its cooperation and coordination 
with all the parties and promoting regional economic integration. China 
has joined the fellow Asian countries in discussing the possibility of free 
trade areas, conducting various forms of security dialogues and cementing 
cooperation on the bilateral level while promoting regional cooperation. 
(101) 
Through increased regional economic interdependence, the PRC perceives the 
means to eventually garner dominant influence in the region that exceeds that of its 
primary rival, the United States. Economic strength and prosperity is something that Asia 
as a region desires and can agree on as a priority and vital to national survival in the 
modern age.  
It currently shares a “strategic partnership” with Russia through which it has 
acquired technologically advanced military hardware to modernize its armed forces, 
secured its Western frontier, and garnered support from the Russian state for its stance on 
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the aggressive re-unification of Taiwan and crackdown on the Uighur separatists in 
Xinjiang (102). It also hopes to open a free trade zone in Eurasia, increase cross-border 
railroad trade traffic, and open a Russia-to-China pipeline to help relieve China’s 
increasing oil thirst wrought by its exploding economy and growth.  
India and China have been in involved in long-standing talks regarding 
cooperative military cooperation, particularly joint exercises between the two states, and 
soldiers from both countries have routinely met and had meals during training exercises 
in the rugged border regions between them. As of 12 April 2005, the PRC and India 
agreed to establish a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” that focuses on the 
economically beneficial aspects of a China-India alliance and encourages both sides to 
promote, “cooperation in the spheres of education, science and technology, health care, 
information, tourism, youth exchange, agriculture, dairy development, sports and other 
fields on the basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity” (103). Both nations readily 
acknowledge the vital economic dimension of their “partnership” and hope to increase 
the bilateral trade volume between them to US $20 billion or higher by 2008 (104). 
China and Pakistan have enjoyed good military, political and economic relations 
with each other for over fifty years--“friendly neighbors linked by mountains and 
waters,” according to PRC former leader, Jiang Zemin--and continue to do so. China has 
been an investor and collaborator on a number of large Pakistani infrastructure projects 
that contributed to the strength of Pakistan’s economy and the PRC’s influence in 
Pakistan. These projects include the Pakistan Heavy Electrical Complex completed in the 
1960s, the Karakorum Highway constructed in the 1970s, the Muzaffargarh power plant 
which went into operation in the 1980s and the Chashma nuclear power plant completed 
not long ago (105), “vivid symbols of our friendly cooperation,” according to a PRC 
official.   
Relations between Southeast Asia and the PRC are steadily improving, despite 
China’s past as an invader, occupier and sponsor of Communist insurgencies in the 
region. Near the end of last decade, the PRC had allayed Southeast Asia fears of a 
Chinese military invasion and downplayed simmering territorial issues between them and 
focused on foster overall stronger economic ties in the region, a move assisted by China’s 
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refusal to devalue its own currency while those of its neighbors fell during the 1997/98 
Asian economic crisis (106). As of November 2004, China and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) agreed to gradually remove tariffs, 
creating the world’s largest free-trade area by 2011 (107).  
Although the PRC regards Korea as a single entity (not North and South), it is 
politically savvy enough to deal with them on a per-state basis. The border between the 
DPRK and China is virtually porous, with unimpeded travel between them, particularly in 
light of the North’s worsening economic situation. The PRC receives refugees and day 
workers seeking better wages and living conditions in China while. Much to Seoul’s 
relief, China also acts as intermediary between the DPRK and United States. Although 
the ROK is wary of the PRC’s intentions in the region and still needs the United States as 
a hedge against it and the DPRK, it still likes the prospects of continued Chinese 
economic growth. It perceives Chinese economic prosperity in a dual light: as a potential 
threat and competitor to the ROK’s economy, particularly in the IT sector8, but also as 
expanded business prospects and opportunities to acquire wealth for the South (108). 
Since the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1992, the ROK has 
poured over US $30 billion in direct investment into the PRC. In 2002, the PRC eclipsed 
the United States as the ROK’s primary trading partner, garnering 20.9 percent (US $40 
billion) of exports against the United State’s 20.2 percent, a trade volume between the 
two Asian states that grows by 20 percent annually (109).   
Officially, Taiwan-China relations appear locked in the status quo as the PRC 
maintains its “one China” stance, asserts that the China-Taiwan relations are a domestic 
matter, and that Taiwan is a breakaway province that must be reunified with the PRC by 
whatever means necessary, even if it means military action. The Anti-Secession Law 
adopted by the PRC on 13 March 2005 raises the ante even further as any effort by 
Taiwan to overtly achieve independence from the mainland could be legally met with 
military force by the PRC (110). Unofficially, visits by the Democratic People’s Party 
 
8 South Korea is placing tighter controls on the export of electronic and telecommunications technology to the 
PRC where it previously had not. China’s own high-tech exports constitute 38 percent of its export totals, roughly 
equivalent to South Korea’s. 
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(DPP) government’s opposition, particularly the leaders of the Peoples’ First Party (PFP) 
and Kuomintang Party (KMT), and the PFP leader’s public stance against Taiwanese 
independence signals a warming of relations between the two states (111) that could 
mean reconciliation and have negative repercussions on American influence in the 
region. Direct economic ties between China and Taiwan are still negligible, despite the 
membership of both countries in the World Trade Organization, brisk and expanding 
commerce between them continue through Hong Kong. China and Taiwan conducted US 
$41 billion in cross-straits trade in 2003 and over US $50 billion in 2004 (112).         
With the second largest economy in the world and status as a traditional American 
regional ally, Japan could become a military rival to the PRC. China, still haunted by the 
Japanese occupation and its atrocities during the Second World War, worries about latent 
Japanese militarism. This dynamic has been kept down in the post-war years by the 
presence of the United States, the seeming pacifist tendencies of its post-war generation 
and the prosperous Japanese economy. China will use the “war-guilt card” against Japan 
for the foreseeable future as a means to garner various concessions from the island state 
and to ensure that Japan finds it politically uncomfortable to rearm itself (113). A Japan 
with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council is a direct challenge to the 
power and influence that China holds as the sole Asian power with such a position. 
Simultaneously, the PRC seeks expanded trade opportunities with Japan. Despite 
the bloody history between them, both are sufficiently pragmatic to realize that they stand 
to gain much through a strong China-Japan trade alliance, one not separated by oceanic 
or regional barriers. Current estimates indicate that by the year 2015 the volume of 
China-Japan trade will outstrip that between the United States and Japan (114). 
Continuing economic growth and political stability in China and greater economic 
integration with Japan will contribute to the strengthening of the Sino-Japanese 
relationship and the growth of the PRC’s regional power and influence. 
By creating regional alliances that gradually enhance Chinese influence and 
power while checking the economic influence and power of the United States, a country 
not even a geographical part of the region, the PRC may potentially achieve the sort of 
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Asian regional dominance and influence it desires and the kind of power that doesn’t 
necessarily require force of arms to back up.  
This is not to say that the PRC is averse to using military power on its regional 
neighbors in support of its own objectives. It has done so on eight separate occasions 
between the founding the PRC and 1980. The PRC’s sent troops to fight in Korea in 1950 
in response to a perceived threat of an American invasion across the Yalu River and into 
China. The PRC consolidated its control over Tibet in 1958 when it sent the PLA to crush 
Tibetan insurgents who had opposed the imposition of Beijing’s rule. China twice shelled 
the Taiwanese-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu, in 1954 in response to the lifted 
American naval blockade and perceived threat of invasion by Taiwan and in 1958 in 
retaliation for the deployment of American nuclear-capable forces to Taiwan (115). The 
PLA routed the Indian army during the Sino-Indian war and prevented Indian forces from 
occupying territories in the North-East Frontier Agency (now called the Arunachal 
Pradesh) that were disputed by both countries. The Sino-Soviet military buildup and 
border clashes resulted from Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions toward the PRC 
after the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the PRC’s shift in focus 
from an American to a Soviet threat. The PLA seized the Xisha (Paracel) Islands from 
South Vietnam in a joint amphibious operation in 1974 to enforce its claim to them after 
a territorial dispute. China even invaded its former partner, Vietnam, in 1979 in 
“punishment” for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Currently, the PRC has sent 
naval and ground forces to outposts on the oil and gas-rich Spratly Islands to assert its 
claim to them (116) over four other regional claimants (Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and 
the Philippines), and it still reserves the right to reunify Taiwan by force if necessary. 
Ideally, China does not seek to exercise military force within the very region that 
it is striving to nurture strong economic ties. Nothing shatters a nation’s economy more 
quickly than the destruction wrought by war, especially a modern high-tech war that 
would bring fast moving forces and massive firepower to bear on an opponent’s military 
forces and infrastructure in an effort to bring a conflict to a speedy end. The PRC desires 
strategic or at least amicable partnerships with its neighbors and the economic  
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interdependence that these partnerships engender as a means to reduce the possibility of 
having to exercise military action and increase its own influence and power in the Asia 
region. 
 
B. PLA SOF AND PRC AMBITIONS 
Where does PLA SOF fit into within China’s strategic ambitions of regional 
dominance? PLA SOF are an attempt by the PRC to develop a relatively inexpensive 
power-projection capability for itself and expand its strategic military reach beyond its 
own borders while checking or threatening the military ambitions of other regional 
players. Being a dominant regional power means possibly having to exercise military 
force against threats to that power, even if one does not want to. As a means to infiltrate 
and covertly spy on and precisely attack potential regional rivals, PLA SOF can serve as 
“soft” coercion. It presents the veiled but very real threat of military action by an 
“invisible” foe leveled against a would-be regional adversary. A precise and discrete 
force, PLA SOF are the surgeon’s scalpel hidden in the sleeve cuff in contrast to the 
arcing sledgehammer of a mobilization on the border, air strike or blitzkrieg-style attack 
by massed high-tech forces, and can help reduce the collateral destruction wrought by a 
high-tech blitzkrieg-style war.  
China has come a long way from its modernization efforts in the late 1970s. The 
PLA has a professional force with better more technologically advanced equipment and 
an effective-looking but unproven doctrine and strategy for their collective use. In 
numbers, it is the most powerful indigenous military in the Asian region (though not the 
most high-tech), seconded only by India (117). Much of the PLA, though better trained, 
operates 1950s-1960s gear because the state economy still takes priority over the 
military. PLA SOF is a relatively inexpensive and cost-effective means for the PRC to 
exercise a degree of regional force projection while its hardware-based force projection 
capabilities are purchased, developed or catch up. In accordance with the prevailing 
doctrine of Local War Under High Tech Conditions, PLA SOF is an existing and 
developing though limited tool for precision surveillance and strike.  
PLA SOF have been a part of the PLA force structure for nearly two decades, 
during which time they have continued to acquire more sophisticated weapons and gear 
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while training and honing their skills. During the 1990s and 2000s, they participated in a 
number of large scale exercises in the Military Regions and the Taiwan Straits in support 
of PLA conventional forces, while, like most SOF units worldwide, keeping a relatively 
low profile. PLA SOF units can be transported in a number of ways to target locations, 
infiltrate within striking distance and conduct reconnaissance, attack or both missions. 
Following the example of American SOF, PLA SOF are also a discrete and logical choice 
of weapon with which the PRC may deal with current and future regional conflicts, a 
coercive tool that could be used without the risk of potentially escalating tensions to the 
point where larger scale and more destructive conventional forces are committed (118). It 
is a force in synchronization with the PRC’s current doctrine and strategy of Local War 
Under High-Tech Conditions; it is tactically and technically proficient, equipped with the 
best and most advanced gear that the PRC can supply; it can deploy and strike on short 
notice and, because of its soldiers’ training and high-tech equipment, achieve a relative 
local superiority over its adversaries locally to resolve conflicts quickly.  
Interestingly, although the PLA possesses dedicated SOF modeled on American 
SOF, it seems satisfied, for the time being, with the DA and SR missions these forces 
perform. There does not appear to be much interest or desire to build an American SOF-
style Unconventional Warfare capability into PLA SOF, despite the historical and 
doctrinal propensity, and apparent success with such operations. People’s War itself was 
an enormous national-scale UW campaign. The PRC’s attempts to export Communism to 
and inspire Communist insurgencies in its regional neighbors--in some cases, 
successfully--proves that UW is a skill that the PRC knows and can apply very well. 
 
C. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND US SPECIAL FORCES 
In Thomas K. Adams’ book US Special Operations Forces in Action, the author 
defines Unconventional Warfare (UW) as:  
Those military activities conducted within a conflict environment that are 
not directed toward or directly supporting conventional warfare. It 
includes humanitarian operations, complex emergencies, insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, support to civil authority, nation-building and some 
forms of subversion, sabotage and similar activities. Intelligence gathering 
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is an incidental function in most forms of UW. It is distinguished from 
conventional warfare by the fact that UW does not seek to destroy enemy 
military forces in combat (119). 
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines UW as: 
A SOF principal mission involving a broad spectrum of military and 
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately 
conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, 
equipped, supported and directed, in varying degrees, by an external 
source. UW includes guerrilla warfare and other direct-offensive, low-
visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect 
activities of subversion, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape 
(120). 
Both definitions generally agree in their emphasis on conducting long-
duration operations in support of ultimately larger political objectives.    
As the PLA has a successful history with special operations missions, it has an 
equally distinguished past as practicioners of Unconventional Warfare as described by 
both Adams and the DOD. During the 1948-1960 Malayan Emergency Chinese “Red 
Army” officers infiltrated Malaya from the PRC to help reorganize and train the 
Communist Chinese and Malayan guerrilla forces in support of the Malayan Communist 
Party’s (MPC) ongoing insurgency against the British colonial forces (121). PLA military 
advisors participated in both phases of the Indochina War; during the siege of Dien Bien 
Phu, China provided 6,000 tons of food and material assistance to the People’s Army of 
Vietnam (PAVN), including over 200 heavy artillery pieces and PLA crews to operate 
them; American Studies and Observation Group (SOG) missions routinely encountered 
Chinese military advisors among the Viet Cong and PAVN units they encountered in 
North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (122). In order to determine the possibility of the 
PLA SOF developing an American Special Forces-style Unconventional Warfare 
capability we must first examine what defines such a capability and what is entailed 
therein.  
As the Second World War drew to close, the Office of Special Services (OSS), 
the United State’s premiere intelligence gathering and special operations apparatus, had 
civilian and military operational components. The civilian part, three-man Jedburgh 
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teams, infiltrated German-occupied territory to make contact with and aid resistance 
forces in Europe, while the military piece, Operational Groups (OG), consisted of fifteen-
man teams of very experienced soldiers. They were highly skilled in battlefield tradecraft 
and trained in the language of their mission areas in order to help them communicate and 
blend in with the civilian populations and guerrilla fighters with whom they’d contact and 
interact.  
Their mission was difficult: lead, live with and fight like the indigenous 
guerrillas; wreak havoc behind the enemy lines through ambush, sabotage and being 
difficult to catch; and provide useful intelligence to Allied commanders. The OG 
component of the OSS evolved into the current United States Army Special Forces, more 
commonly known as Green Berets. The end of the Second World War and onset of the 
Cold War saw the projected enemy change, but the mission remained essentially the 
same. In the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and in the face of 
overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority and the inevitability of being overrun, 
Special Forces detachments were detailed as stay-behind units which would raise 
American-friendly guerrilla forces behind Soviet lines and cause all manner of 
destruction and mayhem in the enemy occupied territories.  
The Kennedy administration opened the door to the Special Forces UW mission. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, American military and civilian leaders became increasingly 
concerned with the emergence and spread of Communism and the methodology behind 
its seeming success. Greek Communist guerrillas had challenged the state and were 
crushed only through massive American assistance. The PRC had emerged under the 
Communist banner after a four year civil war with American-backed Nationalist forces. 
The Malayan Emergency would rage for twelve years as British forces attempted to root 
out and destroy the Chinese and Malayan Communist insurgents. The first chapter in the 
Indochina War had ended with a Communist victory over the French colonial forces.   
These were but a few of the conflicts involving Communist insurgent forces and 
the politically-driven wars they preferred to wage, particularly in the post-colonial Third 
World where the Communist ideology “made sense” to populations tired of external 
domination. These conflicts highlighted a growing realization in the White House and 
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Pentagon that future conflicts--“just wars of national liberation” as stated by Nikita 
Khrushchev9--might require forces and methods beyond the capabilities of the 
conventional military. Despite the assertions of some American military leaders that, 
“any good soldier can handle guerrillas,”10  President Kennedy advocated and sought to 
develop military forces capable of effectively addressing the various factors--military, 
social, cultural, economic and political--that contributed to the spread and apparent 
popularity of Communism. Kennedy assigned that developmental task to the United 
States Army Special Forces (123).  
Currently, a United States Special Forces-style UW capability addresses the 
gamut of traditional conventional operations, most specifically variations on DA (raids, 
including counter terrorism) and SR, but distinguish themselves as the sole American 
SOF unit specifically developed and trained to address the full spectrum and 
combinations of UW tasking. In addition to being very experienced soldiers, adaptable to 
a variety of climates and conditions, and highly skilled in combat tradecraft, Special 
Forces are acknowledged cultural and language experts in the particular region to which 
they are assigned (1st Special Forces Group is responsible for the Pacific and East Asia 
region and its operators are Korean/Chinese/Indonesian cultural experts and language 
speakers, 5th Group covers the Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa region and its 
soldiers are trained in the cultures and languages indigenous to those regions, and so on).  
American Special Forces soldiers are skilled teachers and trainers and battlefield 
diplomats, responsible for raising, advising and sometimes leading effective fighting 
forces from the indigenous populations of their regions. During the 1980s the 7th Special 
Forces Group prepared the Honduran Military to resist and defeat a Nicaraguan invasion 
(124). 5th Special Forces Group operators advised and fought side by side with Afghan 
warlords and rebels during Operation Enduring Freedom and, working together, 
eventually ran the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan (125). Because of their 
cultural awareness and language capability, extensive training, and adaptability, Special 
 
9 Mentioned in a speech given by the Soviet leader in 1961 in which he pledged Soviet support for 
such wars. 
10 Army Chief of Staff (1960-62) George Decker: rationale against mounting a concerted counter-
insurgency effort against the Viet Cong and PAVN.  
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Forces operators are often required to live and thrive among their indigenous hosts and 
out of contact of other American units for extended periods of time. As such, they are the 
ideal agents to discover what motivates and moves a region’s indigenous population, and 
exploit that discovery in support of the United State’s political and strategic objectives. 
Under the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, Special Forces elements 
were assigned to remote Montagnard villages to arm and train their fiercely independent 
populations to resist Viet Cong and PAVN “tax collectors” during the Vietnam War 
(126). 
Currently, PLA SOF is where it needs to be as far as missions and capabilities that 
support Local War Under High-Tech Conditions and the PRC’s goal of regional 
dominance. China is certainly capable of developing and successfully employing a 
“Green Beret” type UW capability in its SOF contingents; UW according to Adams takes 
into account a range of actions, from insurgent training to nation-building, all in support 
of an ultimately political goal. The DOD definition of UW is more military in orientation, 
but is also cognizant of the desired political outcome. Both definitions of UW and 
People’s War itself are geared toward fighting a lengthy politically motivated conflict.  
Presently, a built in UW capability is something that the PRC neither requires nor 
desires from PLA SOF or any of its other military units. From a doctrinal and military 
perspective, a PLA SOF UW capability is outside of the constraints or operational 
objectives of Local War Under High Tech Conditions. Current PLA doctrine borrows 
heavily from Chinese military analysts’ studies of the First Gulf War and the Coalition’s 
victory in the war. It emphasizes a fast-moving, violent attack with overwhelming, high 
technology forces and massive quantities of PGMs within a limited area (A War Zone 
Campaign) to achieve relative superiority over hostile forces and end regional or border 
conflicts swiftly (127). Logically, Local War Under High Tech Conditions might entail 
penetration of the adversary’s borders, airspace or territorial waters in order that the 
opposing forces are destroyed and the fighting brought to an end, but it neither requires 
nor desires the long-term occupation of or stationing of troops in the target state’s 
territory.  
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PLA SOF is, pure and simple, a reconnaissance and raiding force, one capable of 
supporting conventional operations or conducting them, albeit on a smaller scale and 
higher intensity than the conventional military. In line with Local Limited War Under 
High Tech Conditions, PLA SOF can hit hard and fast, and do so with surgical precision 
in support of PRC regional power projection. An American-style UW capability entails 
the intention and determination to stay in a target state’s territory for a long stretch of 
time, sometimes in order to affect regime change and in violation of that state’s 
sovereignty. The PRC feels very strongly about maintenance and violation of 
sovereignty, a throwback to when it was invaded, treated unfairly and raped for resources 
by greedy European powers, then invaded, brutalized and raped for resources by the 
Japanese.  
Except in cases when the PRC believed that it was upholding its territorial claims 
(Tibet, Parcels), 11 it has not sought to occupy ground for any appreciable length of time 
in another country’s territory in violation of that country’s sovereignty. The PRC 
withdrew its troops from Korea once the fighting there had ended in 1953, while 
American forces have been there since. It withdrew to the original “line of actual control” 
in Arunachal Pradesh shortly after it had routed the Indian army there (128). It withdrew 
its mauled forces from Vietnam in 1979 after sixteen bloody days. The closest the PRC 
got to American SOF-style UW was when the PRC sought to export Communism to and 
foment Communist insurgencies in its regional neighbors. The clandestine nature of such 
insurgencies and the organizations that drove them did not allow the infiltrated Chinese 
military advisors the luxury of remaining stationary and “holding ground,” at least not 
until the “Third Phase” when the insurgents had grown powerful enough to convert to the 
counteroffensive against their adversaries. Nevertheless, Chinese advisors remained in 
country as advisors to the guerrillas until the Communist forces had either lost (Malaya) 
or won (Vietnam). Dedicated PLA SOF, in keeping with contemporary PRC military 
doctrine and sensibilities about sovereignty, are designed and inclined to spy on and 
 
11 Tibet is a contiguous region of China and the Parcels were claimed as part of the Hainan Island 
province. 
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attack ground, not hold it. There is no current or future doctrinal basis for the creation of 
a UW capability within dedicated PLA SOF.   
From a strategic perspective, for the foreseeable future, UW is not a capability 
that the PRC requires or desires. The PRC has been gradually easing toward its strategic 
goal of becoming the dominant player in the region through strong regional economics 
ties with its neighbors rather than force of arms. China’s economic growth and prosperity 
make it an attractive investment opportunity to the regional players, especially now that 
the current power in the region, the United States, is been distracted with the Global War 
On Terror and American military power and economic strength are going to Iraq, 
Afghanistan and that long festering wound in the hind end of Europe, the Balkans. The 
PRC enjoys and continues to cultivate a lucrative state of economic interdependence with 
its regional neighbors. Even former die-hard enemies like Japan and Taiwan see the 
monetary benefits to connecting more closely with and supporting the continued 
economic expansion of the PRC (129). This interdependence is beneficial to all involved 
and would be destroyed or at the very least seriously damaged by armed conflict in the 
region.  
When the PRC was sponsoring Communist insurgencies among its regional 
neighbors, there was a definite strategic incentive for China to engage in UW campaigns 
in places like Malaya, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Supporting Communist 
insurgencies which created neighboring Communist regimes served to strengthen China’s 
position in the region by giving it an ally and expanded sphere of influence toward the 
strategic objective of exporting and supporting Communism worldwide. It was a similar 
game played by the United States. In accordance with NSC68 and the later Reagan 
Doctrine, the United States sought to stamp out Communism or Communist insurgencies 
wherever they cropped up or festered, which gained it allies and additional spheres of 
influence toward the overall strategic goal of containing and eventually “rolling back” 
Communism (130).  
Exporting Communism worldwide and inspiring insurgencies is a dead issue for 
the PRC; there was no real profit in it, so very little opportunity for economic growth and 
prosperity for the state. One glance at the collapsed economies of the former-Soviet 
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Union and North Korea reassured Beijing that it had made the right choice, transitioning 
to a market economy and plugging into regional and international trade. Additionally, a 
Chinese UW capability would be neither useful nor desired by the PRC’s regional 
neighbors. The last thing any of them (with the possible exception of Burma which is 
attempting to modernize its military with PRC assistance) want to see within their 
borders or territorial waters are Chinese soldiers of any kind, especially ones that plan on 
staying awhile. If anything would strain the economic ties that bind the PRC with its 
neighbors it would be an unwanted Chinese military presence on their territory. China 
enjoys its current and very lucrative economic arrangement with its neighbors; it has no 
real incentive to seek military action against them.  
The PRC’s strategic goals are gradually coalescing. It is more economically 
interconnected with its regional neighbors than ever and, as it continues to grow 
economically, it will also do so in regional influence and power. China has already 
overtaken the United States as South Korea’s primary trading partner; Japan will most 
likely follow by 2015 with India and others close on its heels. A regional trading bloc that 
massive and powerful, and led by the PRC, could eventually edge out or greatly diminish 
American regional influence and give China the regional dominance it seeks without ever 
having to resort to military force. PLA SOF, like the PRC’s other forces, conventional 
and otherwise, are an effective hedge against a conflict that might threaten the collective 
regional economy. It presents an implied threat of power projection outside of Chinese 
borders at first, to avoid large-scale military escalation and force an adversary to “back 
down,” and a discrete precision-attack instrument as a last resort. There is no real current 
or future strategic reason for the PRC to develop a UW capability for PLA SOF. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The PRC seeks to achieve a position of regional dominance in Asia, and it will do 
so through simple balance of power politics using regional economic strength and 
influence as its new forum. China is growing wealthier and more prosperous every year 
with a consequent increase in its domestic consumerism, energy use and consumption of 
resources to drive its burgeoning economy. It wants to expand, and so it will have to 
obtain these resources somewhere and somehow, and it must do so at the expense of its 
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regional rival, the United States, a country an ocean away. It may eventually achieve this 
goal; although it is economically interdependent with the United States to the tune of 40 
percent of its foreign trade, it is quickly cultivating similar relationships with its regional 
neighbors. Russia could be a non-starter, but is still a useful weapons and technology 
bazaar. Pakistan has been its ally for 50 years. India, Korea, ASEAN, Taiwan and Japan, 
most former enemies and rivals, are all forging stronger economic ties with the PRC 
which will eventually trump those of the United States.  
In accordance with Local War Under High Tech Conditions, PLA SOF play into 
the PRC’s ambitions as a means of limited and discrete regional power projection. It is an 
implied consequence to regional players attempting to buck China’s rising economic 
power with military aggression, and a fast, hard-hitting first-response force to be used in 
unfortunate event military force is required. These forces are well trained and capable of 
“making the point” in support of the PRC’s goals without risking the mess of escalating 
hostilities to conventional forces and disrupting the region’s interdependent economy.  
The American SOF-style UW mission never really comes into play for dedicated 
PLA SOF. The PRC is fully capable of developing UW for its SOF contingents and has 
even conducted several UW campaigns in the past. Doctrinally, the UW mission does not 
fit the contemporary PLA’s emphasis on fighting violent, high-speed, short duration 
conventional wars, nor does it conform to the PRC’s seeming aversion to holding 
territory that does not belong to it. Strategically, UW is also a bad fit because the PRC is 
no longer concerned with exporting Communism worldwide, an ideal time and forum for 
UW, but expanding its economic power within the Asia region. It does not require a 
fighting force that can “win the hearts and minds” of its regional neighbors; its economy 
is doing that job. All it needs in a SOF capability is excellent surveillance and direct 






The Maoist-inspired doctrine of People’s War did no favors for the PRC as far as 
giving it an armed force capable of fighting modern wars. It was predicated on the 
perception of comparative Chinese weaknesses against other economically wealthier and 
more technologically developed states. It was purely defensive in nature in that it allowed 
for an enemy invasion of China and ended when the enemy had been beaten back and 
ejected from Chinese territory. People’s War was heavy on infantry and politically 
indoctrinated/reliable troops, poor in technology and militarily professional forces, and 
made no provision for a long-term stay within an enemy’s borders.  
With the exception of the “War of Resistance Against Japan,” it was not used a 
single time by Chinese armed forces in modern warfare. Korea, India, Vietnam, all were 
ground offensives against other sovereign states within the Asia region. The Tibet and the 
Xisha Island campaigns do not qualify because of their status as historically Chinese 
sovereign territory, but, like the others, there was the offensive element in them. People’s 
War took very little account of the changing technological face of modern warfare and 
de-emphasis of infantry warfare, save a late 1970s name change to People’s War Under 
Modern Conditions which was more of the same but with decrepit military hardware and 
nuclear weapons.  
Consequently, when the PLA came face to face with Vietnam, a determined 
regional adversary that was smaller but armed with the best that the former-soviet Union 
and United States could offer, their ground offensive was a costly fiasco. The Sino-
Vietnamese War, even more than Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations, was primarily 
responsible for pushing the PLA towards building a modern, professional fighting force. 
This war was the initial agent of change in the PLA; it prompted a streamlining of the 
infantry-heavy military to make way for modern, technologically advanced gear and gave 
priority to military and technical proficiency over political reliability, resulting in a 
military and political atmosphere within the PRC and PLA in which dedicated PLA SOF 
could eventually emerge.  
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Chinese perceptions of events within and beyond their borders during the late 
1970s and early 1980s contributed to the PLA SOF-friendly atmosphere within the PRC. 
In Chinese eyes, the former-Soviet Union was on the decline while the United States was 
on the rise. Both superpowers had accumulated massive stockpiles of nuclear and 
conventional weapons, but neither possessed the strategic advantage to use them first. 
Not only was the PRC taking its first baby steps into the global market economy, but it 
believed that a general period of peace was at hand during which it could strengthen its 
own economy and military. Most importantly, as the superpowers jockeyed for influence 
in the Third World, those nations played both sides against the middle to their own 
advantage, leading to an overall slackening of superpower influence and the emergence 
of conflicts rooted in ethnic, economic or historical disputes rather than ideologically-
driven polar tensions.  
The defensive doctrine of People’s War gave way to the more offensive Local 
Limited War as the doctrine for fighting these new conflicts. Designed to project high-
tech combat power into the Asia region beyond the PRC’s borders and shores, it looked 
great in theory, but was a strategic and practical impossibility for the cash-strapped 
technologically-lacking PRC when it was instituted in 1984-85. Lacking effective power 
projection tools or the means to develop or purchase them for the immediate future, the 
PRC and PLA turned to a ready resource that it had in plentiful supply to build a 
relatively inexpensive power projection capability that would not break the bank. The 
state now possessed the manpower with the necessary training, professionalism and 
military-oriented mindset to create and develop dedicated PLA SOF contingents. It also 
had the readily available historical examples and lessons of American SOF to draw on 
and from which to model their own SOF units, resulting in the creation of the first 
dedicated PLA SOF unit in the Guangzhou Military Region in 1988.  
 The United States provided motivation for the acceleration of PLA SOF through 
the venue of the First Gulf War. In addition to a modification of doctrine to Local War 
Under High Tech Conditions in the face of the American-led Coalition’s fast, violent, 
high-tech blitzkrieg against the Chinese-equipped Iraqi armed forces, the PLA was able 
to learn from the missions and experiences of Coalition SOF units. They incorporated 
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much of what they gleaned into the creation and development of additional SOF units and 
capabilities during the 1990s and early 2000s. Between the three branches of the PLA, 
there are 25,000-30,000 PLA SOF operators: roughly 7-8 percent of the total force.      
Although PLA SOF contingents appear modeled closely on American SOF, there 
are distinct differences, specifically in their disregard of an American SOF-style UW 
capability. This rejection is not difficult to understand in the context of PLA military 
doctrine and what the PRC wants to achieve in the region. Under Local War Under High 
Tech Conditions, PLA SOF need not have a UW capability to be a power projection tool. 
It does not need to infiltrate its regional neighbors with the intentions of recruiting their 
populations to fight against their governments, or occupy foreign ground for any 
appreciable amount of time. PLA SOF just has to hit hard, fast and precisely toward the 
goal of ending regional conflicts quickly and avoiding an escalation of hostilities. 
Strategically, the PRC is doing with strategic partnerships and economic interdependence 
what it is loathe attempt through force of arms: increase its influence and power to 
become the dominant player in the Asia region. Presently, there is no real gain for the 
PRC by building an integral UW capability into the PLA or PLA SOF. 
 
B. WHAT’S NEXT? 
Is there a possibility in the future for the creation and development of an integral 
PLA SOF UW capability? What is the potential long-range view for the prospects of 
dedicated PLA SOF? Since the development of Chinese military capabilities rest upon 
trends in the PRC and in the world, an assessment of such trends is necessary. As long as 
the resources keep flowing into the PRC, we may anticipate a continuation of the 
economic growth and prosperity that China has enjoyed in degrees since Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s.  
Where is the breaking point at which resource demand and consumption outpace 
the ability of large consumer states like the PRC and United States to locate and supply 
them? Already, the global petroleum market is feeling the strain of the demand that just 
these two countries are putting on it. Fuel prices at the pump which were between 90 
cents and US $1.20 per gallon in the late 1990s in the United States have soared to nearly 
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US $3.00 nationwide in the wake of the GWOT, Second Gulf War and occupation, and 
swiftly increasing Chinese demand (131). The petroleum supply is finite, and given both 
China’s and the United States’ insatiable thirst for oil to fuel their energy requirements 
and economies--not to mention those of other modern industrialized nations--the situation 
will only tighten. With the PRC’s continuing focus on economic growth, a threat of 
reduced petroleum intake might be perceived as a threat to the state as a whole and 
become a potential bone of contention between it and the United States.  
Could a conflict over dwindling oil supplies and who controls them become a 
military one? There is potential for it. The ongoing five-way feud over the Spratly Islands 
is driven not only by issues of historical national sovereignty, but by the desires of the 
individual claimants to develop the islands and their surrounding area for their oil and 
natural gas wealth. Skirmishes between China and the other claimants over the Spratlys 
have led to the destruction of Chinese military property and the deaths of Vietnamese 
sailors (132). Recently, China has played down the dispute over the Spratlys in an 
attempt to foster greater economic interdependence in the region, but the possibility of 
military action exists. Likewise, the possibility of a military confrontation between the 
United States and the PRC over resources, although remote, exists. However, considering 
the United States is the PRC’s and much of the Asia region’s primary trading partner and 
global meal ticket (at least until a regional trade bloc can, if at all, replace it), and a more 
powerful military entity to boot, it seems unlikely that the PRC would opt for military 
action against it to secure resources. 
Will PLA SOF be able to address its current problems and by doing so acquire 
additional capability? Logistically, PLA SOF is hamstrung by its dependence on extra-
unit transportation to deploy, infiltrate to the mission and exfiltrate afterwards. It appears 
to be a system that works for now; like military organizations worldwide, the PLA works 
on the “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” principle. It took the Sino-Vietnamese War to make 
the PRC and PLA modernize, professionalize and adopt a modern warfighting doctrine. 
Unfortunately for PLA SOF, it will most likely require a major special operations 
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debacle, probably on the order of a Desert One12, to force the PRC and PLA to address 
the potential dangers of mixing and matching conventional and special operations forces. 
Likewise, the direct control the CMC exercises over its PLA SOF contingents, 
which likely won’t change as long as the PLA remains a tool for domestic and external 
security. Desert One was a harbinger of disaster for the disjointed American SOF 
command structure. The invasion of Grenada was the breaking point and impetus for the 
United States building a unified SOF-specific and led command structure (133). It will be 
interesting to see what, if anything, does the trick for the PRC and PLA SOF.          
Is there a possibility, no matter how seemingly remote now, of the PRC adopting 
a UW capability for its armed forces in the future? Will there be teams of “Red Beret” 
(134) advisors and PLA Civil Affairs personnel dispatched throughout the region in 
pursuit of the PRC’s objective of gaining or maintaining dominant regional influence and 
power? The emergence of the United States Army’s Special Forces UW mission was a 
direct adjunct to the country’s strategic goal of containing then beating back Communism 
(and the insurgencies it engendered) wherever it reared it head around the world. The 
Kennedy Administration wanted to develop a force that was capable not only of dealing 
with Communist guerrillas in the field, but tackling the myriad other less military factors 
within the society of a particular state that encouraged their creation and spread and made 
Communism seem an attractive option (135). It seems difficult (for this author, at least) 
to imagine what strategic benefits the PRC would reap through a PLA UW effort within 
its regional neighbors’ borders. What would be the selling point and motivation for 
mounting such an expedition? What would be the targeted disaffected portion of the 
population among the Asia region with which the PLA would connect? What region host 
government could benefit from the deployment of PLA troops on their territory? 
Currently, and probably for the foreseeable future, the PRC’s regional neighbors 
appear, for the most part, to be satisfied with their own gradually improving individual 
economic situations and their increasing economic interdependence with PRC. By 2011, 
ASEAN and the PRC will have between them the largest free trade zone in the world, 
 
12 United States’ 1980 attempt to mount a special operation in Iran to rescue American hostages 
following the Iranian Revolution.   
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helping even the poorer CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) set to grow and 
prosper. The steadily improving economic conditions in the region will likely reduce the 
possibility of domestic strife and the possibility of factions within the population willing 
to become or support guerrilla fighters. Both the Malayan Emergency and Huk Rebellion 
stand as historical examples of how improved economics among the general population 
helped cut guerrillas off from their lifelines in the towns and countryside during an 
insurrection in progress. 13  
Peace in the region is good for everybody’s economic growth and prosperity; 
nobody there wants to see that change. Presently and for the foreseeable future, the PRC 
has no motivation to undertake a UW campaign on its neighbors’ territory; it is working 
toward exactly what it wants strategically by fostering strong economic ties with them. 
Somehow, a UW campaign under the strategic auspices of “stopping the encroachment of 
rampant free-market capitalism” just does not seem plausible in the contemporary Asia 
region. 
What disaffected population could a PLA SOF UW campaign target within its 
regional neighbors? None, if the PRC seeks to successfully continue its drive toward 
increasing its own personal wealth, influence and power, and economic interdependence 
in the region. Muslim fundamentalists are probably the most dangerous of the disaffected 
factions in the region and the PRC would not touch them with a ten foot pole. China has a 
long history of strife with Muslim rebellions within its own borders dating back to the 
Qing Dynasty (136). The PRC has publicly supported Russia’s attempts to crush Chechen 
separatists and openly supports the United States’ GWOT to justify cracking down on 
Muslim fundamentalists in Xinjiang (137). Despite the desires of the regional 
governments to cash in on the PRC’s increasing economic prosperity, there is no way that 
they would willingly invite PLA troops into their respective countries.  
China has worked hard to gain the trust of its neighbors, but many are still 
suspicious of Chinese military intentions in the region. The Southeast Asian states in 
 
13 600,000 Chinese Malays were resettled into “New Villages” and given their own land, isolating 
them from the Chinese Communist insurgents while simultaneously improving their overall standard of 
living. The Philippine population in the countryside was similarly located to settlements on Mindinao 
where they were given their own land and separated from the Communist Huks.  
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particular are still haunted by the centuries-long history of Chinese domination and the 
twentieth century legacy of the PRC’s support of Communist insurgencies within their 
territories. With the exceptions of Myanmar, which admits PLA troops to help revamp 
and modernize its armed forces, and Indonesia where the PLA assisted in the post-
tsunami cleanup, 14 Chinese troops are, for the most part, unwelcome guests within the 
borders of the PRC’s regional neighbors.  
The Prospects for an integral UW capability within PLA SOF seem non-existent 
at this time in history and for the foreseeable future. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The PRC appears to be building a conventional military capability based on the 
United States’ model. Even its dedicated SOF contingents are designed and tasked with a 
conventional warfighting capability in mind, as befits the doctrine of Local Limited War 
Under High Tech Conditions. Let them build. For now and the immediate future, the 
PRC armed forces are limited to regional operations, which might seem threatening 
except for the country’s emphasis on strengthening its own economy and building 
economic bridges between itself and its neighbors, reducing the potential for conflict and 
regional destabilization. The PRC’s economy and technological base, so far, cannot 
support the kind of force that would permit guaranteed success against a concerted effort 
by a determined high-tech adversary, hence their current focus on POEs and achieving 
local superiority within a small area (138).  
The tactical threat posed by PLA SOF contingents is high as regards their training 
and on-the-ground tactical capability. They are apparently well-trained and very capable 
units; during a recent SOF exercise held in Estonia, PLA SOF competed against 28 other 
SOF units from countries like Britain, Italy and France, and garnered third place overall 
(Estonian teams took first and second place) (139). The strategic threat posed by PLA 
SOF units is somewhat lower, primarily because of their logistical weakness. They are,  
 
 
14 The December 26 2004 tsunamis, which swept through the Indian Ocean and devastated Indonesia’s 
coastal communities. 
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like their conventional brethren, limited to regional power projection, a situation 
exacerbated by their lack of dedicated deployment and infiltration transportation and 
attached crews.  
In the same way that watching developments in the PRC conventional military 
can provide insights as to what the PRC and PLA have learned and seek to achieve 
militarily and strategically in the future, so can keeping an eye  PLA SOF developments. 
Things to watch for in PLA SOF include the following: 
1) An expanded logistics capability. Although the PLAAF acquired Russian IL76 
long-range transport planes (140), these aircraft are not assigned to or configured 
for special operations tasking. Look for the acquisition and assignment of an 
American SOF-type dedicated logistics capability on the order of a 160th SOAR 
or a SEAL-type Special Boat Unit (SBU), most likely in response to a failed PLA 
SOF training or real-time operation. An expanded and integral logistics and 
transportation capability within PLA SOF could indicate that the PRC has 
realized the problems inherent in mixing and matching special operations and 
non-special operations assets to execute special operations missions and is finally 
prepared to invest the time and money for the gear and crew training necessary to 
ensure that both men and machines are up to sufficient standards for special 
operations tasking. The creation and development of such a capability could also 
signal that the PRC seeks to assign an expanded mission to its PLA SOF units, 
missions that require specialized vehicles and special operations-trained crews to 
increase the likelihood of success.  
2) A unified PLA SOF command structure and leadership. This probably will not 
happen as long as the PRC uses the PLA as a tool for both internal and external 
security. Again, it will likely take an operational disaster to make a PLA SOF 
unified command structure a possibility, but it should exist if only to address 
specific SOF concerns and advise the CMC as to the realistic capabilities of its 
SOF contingents at the senior military level. The creation and development of an 
additional bureaucratic layer between the individual PLA SOF units and the CMC 
could indicate a realization within the CMC that it doesn’t have all of the answers 
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and might require the input and advice of active PLA SOF experts who are not a 
part of the political machinery to gain a better and more accurate appraisal of PLA 
SOF capabilities. A PLA SOF SOCOM-type structure could also signal that PLA 
SOF has reached a level of maturity within the PLA and has a base of internal 
leadership senior enough to represent the community as a whole on an equal 
footing with conventional PLA officers, with a strong enough voice to be heard at 
the highest levels of the PRC if necessary to protect their community.   
3) Extra-territorial deployments of PLA SOF units in response to regional conflicts. 
The PLA has deployed 4,000 troops to Sudan to provide security for its oil 
development endeavors there (141). It has sent military and technical advisors to 
every country that it has ever sold and delivered weapons and military equipment. 
It has even deployed peacekeeping troops to Liberia under the banner of the 
United Nations, and flown military cargo planes full of supplies to aid Indonesia 
after the tsunamis. What it has not done since the Sino-Vietnamese War is deploy 
soldiers, special or otherwise, to external conflict regions as active combatants15. 
Sending a bunch of glorified security guards or humanitarian helpers is one 
matter; deploying a unit specifically tasked to look for a fight is quite another. 
Such a deployment by PLA SOF would potentially signal an enhancement of PLA 
SOF power projection capabilities in response to an external threat, creating and 
developing an American SOF-type UW capability to fight an unconventional 
conflict. If Chinese interests abroad are threatened in a particular manner by a 
certain kind of enemy, PLA SOF with a UW mission could be the force of choice 
to counter it. If, for instance, rebel forces sufficiently threatened the Chinese oil 
projects in Sudan (142)--potentially a serious threat to the Chinese economy and 
state but not one requiring the full and furious might of the PLA--Sudan could 
conceivably see the deployment of PLA SOF with a UW mission, Counter-
Insurgency, or Foreign Internal Defense, in support of intertwined PRC economic 
and security concerns. Whether or not these forces were actually invited in by the 
 
15 The Spratlys are claimed by the PRC (and four other countries) as sovereign territory, so do not 
count. 
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host country would be a moot point, as they could easily be camouflaged within 
the ranks of the other 4,000 PLA troops on oil security duty. A little closer to 
home, perhaps terrorists or pirates are specifically targeting Chinese cargo vessels 
and oil tankers passing through the Malacca Straits, again potentially threatening 
the PRC’s external economic and state interests but not to a degree that massive 
conventional military force is required or desired. PLA SOF units might covertly 
deploy to the area, with or without the knowledge of the Indonesian or Malaysian 
governments, with a UW Counter-Terrorism mission in support of the PRC’s 
economic and security concerns.      
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